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MONEY THAT COSTS TOO MUCH:
REGULATING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
KRISTEN UNDERHILL
Money may not corrupt. But should we worry if it corrodes? Legal scholars in a
range of fields have expressed concern about “motivational crowding-out,” a
process by which offering financial rewards for good behavior may undermine
laudable social motivations, like professionalism or civic duty. Disquiet about the
motivational impacts of incentives has now extended to health law, employment law,
tax, torts, contracts, criminal law, property, and beyond. In some cases, the fear of
crowding-out has inspired concrete opposition to innovative policies that marshal
incentives to change individual behavior. But to date, our fears about crowding-out
have been unfocused and amorphous; our field lacks the language we need to speak
precisely about these behavioral phenomena, and we have not examined when and
why motivational crowding-out should prompt us to discontinue or temper incentivebased schemes. Without a clear and nuanced picture of the processes, harms, and
benefits of crowding-out, we may well be missing the mark.
This Article canvasses the range of legal areas where crowding-out concerns
arise, and it newly illuminates the specific harms that may be attributable to
crowding-out effects. These hazards include reduced autonomy in the presence of
incentives, a distinct set of behavioral inefficiencies, and the potential degradation
of individual or social values. But this Article also challenges the view of crowdingout as uniformly harmful, offering an alternative vision of potential crowding-out
benefits, such as crowding out invidious motivations, increasing the predictability of
agent activity, and bolstering the efficiency of future incentives. These benefits
suggest that the precautionary principle, which would counsel against using
incentives where crowding-out is possible—is inappropriate for this field.
The Article also proposes a novel taxonomy to help guide regulatory responses to
incentives that cause crowding-out. Different categories of incentives present
different justifications for regulatory intervention and redesign, including autonomy
concerns, efficiency concerns, and negative externalities imposed on third parties.
By organizing incentives based on the relationship between the principal and agent,
we can identify opportunities for regulators and incentive architects to redesign or
limit incentive programs, to leave incentives in place, or to consider discontinuing
incentive-based policies when money indeed “costs too much” in motivation.

Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. JD, Yale Law School (2011); DPhil,
University of Oxford (2007). I am grateful to Ian Ayres, Amy Kapczynski, Bill Sage,
participants in the Petrie-Flom 2014 Annual Conference, and attendees at the American
Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics Health Law Professors Conference for feedback and
formative discussions about incentives and motivation. All errors herein are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Motivations matter in the law. To cite a few examples, motivations have long
been crucial elements of tests in employment law, criminal law, legislative
interpretation, disparate treatment law, and other areas. Now, in a theme cutting
across disciplines, many legal scholars have expressed concern about “intrinsic” and
“extrinsic” motivations, their relative balance, and the potential for extrinsic carrots
and sticks to disrupt laudable values.1 Echoing empirical research in psychology and
economics, this thread of scholarship most frequently uses the term “motivational
crowding-out” to describe a central problem: when an individual encounters an
extrinsic incentive (e.g., a payment or fine) to encourage good behavior, the incentive
may displace or erode her intrinsic motivation for good choices.2 This hidden “cost
of price”3 can cause incentives to be inefficient or even backfire entirely—indeed,
under these conditions, money may “cost too much.” 4 The law relies heavily on
incentives; to take just a few examples, we depend on financial motivations in
workplace wellness programs, incentives for recycling or public transit use, rewards
or fines to motivate voting, and even entire common-law systems such as tort liability
for negligent behavior. If money corrodes motivations such as self-care,
environmental morale, civic duty, professionalism, or altruism, scholars are right to
question whether such programs have reckoned sufficiently with their motivational
impacts.

1. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes,
Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 605,
616–24 (2014); Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 1151, 1178–79 (2010); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders,
Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 83, 98–100 (1978); Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like To Pay Taxes: Taxpayer
Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179,
203–04 (2013); Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences
of “Pay for Performance,” 39 J. CORP. L. 525, 552–53 (2014).
2. See Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polanía-Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social
Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 368 (2012) (surveying
the literature on crowding-out).
3. Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical
Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746 (1997).
4. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Wealth, in THE CONDUCT OF LIFE (1860).
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Given the pervasive uses of incentives throughout the law, commentators have
voiced concerns about crowding-out in a range of domains, including health law,
environmental law, employment law, torts, contracts, property, tax, and criminal law.
These concerns are most frequently speculative, given the paucity of field studies
investigating crowding-out in connection with specific legal policies. But there is a
robust body of crowding-out scholarship outside the law, and our field’s engagement
with crowding-out is often superficial. To evaluate claims about crowding-out, we
need a more complete accounting of how this phenomenon may manifest in the law,
and a framework for bringing the field’s many claims into dialogue. I begin this
Article by offering the first attempt to consolidate the many areas in which crowdingout has aroused concern in the law, canvassing judicial decisions, legislative history,
and legal scholarship.
My second goal in this Article is to move beyond the jumble of legal scholars’
crowding-out concerns to offer a precise overview of the harms and benefits that may
flow from motivational crowding-out. I have previously evaluated the complex and
heterogeneous causes of crowding-out.5 This paper will shift its focus to the
heterogeneous effects that crowding-out may generate. To date, discussions about the
harms attributable to crowding-out have been confused. Legal scholars tend to define
crowding-out as occasions when incentive programs backfire entirely, crowding out
intrinsic motivation so completely that good behavior declines compared to baseline
levels.6 But crowding-out can have many other, more subtle effects that legal
scholars have overlooked. Incentive programs may improve behavior even when
crowding-out occurs, but they may also affect performance quality, sustainability of
performance over time, distribution of tasks across a population, and engagement in
nonincentivized behaviors that rely on similar motivations.
This Article is the first to offer a cross-cutting view of the diverse impacts of
crowding-out in response to incentive-based policies, illuminating not only the
immediate effects of incentives on behavioral engagement, but also considering
performance quality, choking, distraction, gaming, agent selection effects (i.e.,
changes in the population of agents who engage in a desirable behavior), effects on
competition among agents, and spillovers to other behaviors. I then expand this
discussion beyond instrumental effects to consider impacts on autonomy and
individual or societal values. Understanding the full range of crowding-out effects is
essential for measuring the occurrence and magnitude of this behavior as a response
to incentives in the law; current scholarship has acknowledged only a few of these
effects, which impoverishes our efforts to evaluate, endorse, or dismiss crowdingout theory.
In addition to my review of the harms caused by crowding-out, I take the novel
step of proposing that crowding-out may also confer benefits. Incentives may, for

5. See Kristen Underhill, Extrinsic Incentives, Intrinsic Motivation, and Motivational
Crowding-Out in Health Law and Policy, in NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Lynch & Christopher Robertson eds., 2016)
[hereinafter Underhill, Extrinsic Incentives]; Kristen Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives
Displace Intrinsic Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks To Confront the Challenge
of Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 215 (2016) [hereinafter Underhill, When
Extrinsic].
6. See, e.g., Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1, at 1180; Stout, supra note 1, at 552.
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example, displace or erode invidious motivations, such as interpersonal biases that
animate race-based or gender-based discrimination. Incentives that cause crowdingout may make agent activity more predictable, thereby encouraging greater
investment by principals. Crowding-out that reflects changed preferences for
material gain may also make agents more sensitive to future incentives, thereby
improving the efficacy of other incentive-based policies. I will consider these and
other benefits in this Article, considering for the first time in legal scholarship that
these effects may be desirable.
Beyond offering a careful catalog of crowding-out effects, this Article has a third
goal: to consider the normative question of when and why crowding-out should
prompt the regulation, redesign, or discontinuation of incentive plans. There are
many areas of law where federal statutes or regulations already structure the use of
incentive plans by private principals, such as workplace wellness programs, 7 payfor-performance in executive compensation,8 and payment for blood and organ
donation.9 But it is unclear why motivational crowding-out would provide a
persuasive normative basis for regulating the use of incentives. To answer this
question, I first discuss failures in incentive architecture (the design of incentive
plans), identifying several reasons why governmental and private principals may fail
to design incentive plans optimally. I further move to reject the precautionary
principle, which would bar all incentives with crowding-out effects, based in part on
my suggestion that crowding-out may also confer benefits.
Instead of calling for the proscription of incentives that cause crowding-out, I
offer methods for determining when and why regulation may be justified. To guide
efforts to intervene in incentive schemes, this Article proposes a new taxonomy of
incentive plans based on the relationships between principals who offer incentives
(governmental principals, private principals, and agents who self-incentivize), agents
who are incentivized, and intended beneficiaries who receive the benefits of agents’
behavior (i.e., principals, agents themselves, or third parties). Organizing incentive
plans in this way exposes different normative justifications for regulatory
intervention in each category of incentive programs. I suggest, for example, that
when incentives are offered by governments, regulation to redesign or eliminate
these incentive programs would be justified to correct autonomy-related harms,
behavioral inefficiencies, or negative externalities imposed on third-party
beneficiaries. But when incentives are offered by private parties (e.g., pay-forperformance for employees), regulation is only justified to correct autonomy-related
harms or negative externalities; private principals may wish to redesign incentive
schemes independently to correct behavioral inefficiencies, but this justification does
not support regulatory intervention. When agents self-incentivize, such as through

7. E.g., Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78
Fed. Reg. 33,157 (June 3, 2013); Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health
Coverage in the Group Market: Final Rules, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014 (2006).
8. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(m) (West 2017) (disallowing public corporations from
deducting annual compensation above $1 million for the CEO or top four highest compensated
officers, if that compensation is not tied to performance goals); see also Stout, supra note 1,
at 533.
9. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e (West 2017).
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commitment contracting, even autonomy-related harms and negative externalities
disappear as viable justifications for intervention.
To defend these claims, this Article proceeds in several Parts. Part I defines
crowding-out and shows how crowding-out concerns arise in judicial decisions,
legislation and regulation, and legal scholarship. Part II catalogues the large set of
behavioral, autonomy-related, and moral harms attributable to motivational
crowding-out, each of which inspires opposition to incentive arrangements. In Part
III, I offer theoretically appealing benefits of crowding-out, as distinct from the
harms that typically dominate commentary on incentives. Part IV begins by
discussing failures in incentive architecture, detailing why incentive architects may
persist in using incentives that are inefficient, counterproductive, or burdensome for
third parties. I then present my framework for classifying incentive programs, along
with the normative bases for intervention in each category of incentives. This
taxonomy clarifies which incentive programs may be permissible subjects of
regulatory intervention and redesign due to impacts on autonomy, efficiency, and
third parties. I conclude by considering options for modifying incentive-based
policies that give rise to crowding-out harms.
I. CROWDING-OUT CONCERNS IN LAW AND POLICY DESIGN
Motivational crowding-out matters wherever there are efforts to control agents by
external intervention.10 As rewards and punishments are inescapably “the traditional
tools of legal regimes,”11 concerns about crowding-out are similarly inevitable in the
law. Many areas of law deal intimately with principal-agent or fiduciary
relationships, including employment law, torts, health law, family law, education
law, and self-regulation of the professions, all of which seek to align the interests of
agents and principals (loosely defined). Private principals such as employers or
charitable organizations have long used financial and other incentives to motivate
agent behavior, and these programs are coming under increasing scrutiny for
potential crowding-out effects. Recent scholarship has also noted the tendency of
modern regulatory regimes to favor carrots over sticks for the population as a whole,
including areas such as environmental, criminal, and tax law. 12 Incentive-based
policies such as subsidies, tax credits, and other inducements are often more
appealing than conscription, prohibition, and command-and-control regulation.13
Concerns about motivational crowding-out are recurring, but no one has yet
canvassed this literature to understand how crowding-out is invoked. This Part will
consider how judicial decisions, legislative and regulatory activity, and legal
scholarship have engaged with the concept of motivational crowding-out.

10. Bruno S. Frey, On the Relationship Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Work Motivation,
15 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 427, 430 (1997).
11. Eric Fleisig-Greene, Law’s War with Conscience: The Psychological Limits of
Enforcement, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1203, 1217 (2007).
12. Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of
Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 797 (2012).
13. Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrots and the Decline of
Sticks, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 343 (2013).
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A. Motivational Crowding-Out Defined
Before detailing the relevance of motivational crowding-out in the law, however,
a foundational description of crowding-out will be useful. Crowding-out theory
divides motivations into extrinsic and intrinsic; extrinsic motivation is the desire to
obtain a reward or avoid a penalty associated with a task, while intrinsic motivations
encompass most other reasons for behavior, including but not limited to altruism,
civic duty, professionalism, and morality.14 Crowding-out occurs when the
introduction of an extrinsic incentive (either a reward or penalty, including nonfinancial incentives) displaces or erodes an intrinsic motivation for decisions.
Research from behavioral economics and psychology has illuminated a number of
different processes that cause crowding-out. I have elsewhere reviewed these in
detail as signaling processes (i.e., incentives transmit negative information to the
agent, or they impair the agent’s ability to signal good information to outside
observers or themselves); impairment of self-determination; changes in preferences
for money compared to other values over time; and “learned helplessness” effects.15
I distinguish between two forms of crowding-out. Absolute crowding-out occurs
when the use of incentives leads to an absolute reduction in the level of intrinsic
motivation, compared to intrinsic motivation in the absence of an incentive.16 This
reduction may be temporary or permanent, but it persists at least as long as the
incentive is in place. Relative crowding-out occurs when the use of incentives makes
extrinsic motivation the primary reason for behavior, such that agents will engage in
the task regardless of whether intrinsic motivation is present. The two forms of
crowding-out may co-occur; to use a classic example, offering incentives for organ
donation might diminish altruism among potential living donors, but these agents
may nonetheless donate out of a desire to obtain the incentive. Alternately, each form
of crowding-out may occur separately; for example, incentives may not lead to an
absolute reduction in altruistic reasons for donating, but large incentives may mean
that donors are now acting primarily to obtain the rewards, rather than primarily out
of the desire to help others.17 Concerns about crowding-out in the law are primarily
focused on absolute crowding-out, where incentives may potentially impoverish
other motives for good behavior.
B. Judicial Decisions
Judicial decisions have grappled with the problem of motivational crowding-out
in several contexts, including Good Samaritan activity, payment for criminal
informants, and legislation criminalizing payment for blood marrow donation. For
example, a Seventh Circuit decision in 2003 considered the absence of a commonlaw obligation to assist strangers as a Good Samaritan; the court reviewed several
justifications for this gap, including the idea that “liability might actually reduce the

14.
15.
16.
17.

Underhill, When Intrinsic, supra note 5, at 222–23.
Id. at 235–54.
I previously introduced this distinction in Underhill, When Extrinsic, supra note 5.
This distinction will be most useful in Part II.
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number of altruistic rescues by depriving people of credit for altruism (how would
they prove they hadn’t acted under threat of legal liability?).” 18
A long series of judicial decisions has also discussed the practice of offering
informants benefits, typically consisting of sentence reductions or dropped charges,
in exchange for information about criminal activity.19 Defendants in these cases often
challenge incentivized informants’ motivations, on the assumption that information
provided in anticipation of a benefit is less credible than information provided for
altruistic reasons.20 The testimony of incentivized informants, however, is typically
permissible with disclosure of the incentive arrangement, 21 and courts have warned
that the reliance on altruism alone is infeasible in this context.22
One Ninth Circuit case, Flynn v. Holder, has dealt more intensively with
motivational crowding-out and its sequelae as a proffered rational basis for
legislation.23 This case concerned the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA),
part of which specified criminal penalties including fines and imprisonment for
“acquir[ing], receiv[ing], or otherwise transfer[ring] any human organ for valuable
consideration for use in human transplantation” in interstate commerce; “organs”
were defined in such a way as to exclude blood, sperm, and eggs. 24 The Flynn
plaintiffs were individuals alleging present or future unmet needs for bone marrow
transplants, as well as a nonprofit corporation that intended to operate a scholarship
program that would award individual donors $3000 for bone marrow donations. The
plaintiffs sought to permit payment for blood marrow donations provided through
apheresis, a low-risk procedure requiring a course of medication followed by a blood
withdrawal. The Ninth Circuit concluded that this process did not differ meaningfully
from blood donation, thereby exempting it from NOTA’s prohibition on
compensating donors.25

18. Stockberger v. United States, 332 F.2d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2003).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Hullaby, 736 F.3d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 2013) ((“[I]t is
‘common practice for the government to reduce or drop charges against persons who cooperate
with law enforcement officials in the prosecution of others’). We do not require the
government to recruit solely informants who will work in a spirit of altruism for the good of
mankind.”) (quoting United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1469 (9th Cir. 1987)); United
States v. Pomales-Lebron, 513 F.3d 262 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco,
826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Va. 1998).
20. See, e.g., Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 315 (“It is difficult to imagine a greater
motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence . . . .”).
21. See, e.g., id. at 315–16; United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Pope, 330 F. Supp. 2d 948, 954–55 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) (“[C]riminals are
regularly the best source for information about criminal activity, and the test for probable cause
is not the informant’s altruism but the reliability of his information.”).
22. See, e.g., Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (“To prohibit prosecutors from making promises
in exchange for testimony works an ‘absurd’ result where crimes go unresolved because of
worries about testimony that may be questionable, even though the system already has builtin safeguards concerning questionable testimony by interested witnesses.”).
23. 684 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
24. 42 U.S.C.A § 274e (West 2011).
25. Flynn, 684 F.3d at 862–65 (finding that a “blood marrow donation” through peripheral
blood stem cell apheresis is simply a blood donation, and that NOTA clearly exempted the
common practice of payment for blood donation).
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Of greater interest for crowding-out, however, is the court’s analysis of NOTA’s
ban on bone marrow donation through aspiration, a more invasive procedure that
requires anesthesia and the withdrawal of marrow from donors’ hip bone cavities.
This process is not exempt from NOTA, and the Ninth Circuit found that, due in part
to crowding-out fears, NOTA’s bar on compensation survived rational basis
review.26 The government raised several crowding-out worries, including that
“providing financial incentives would decrease the willingness of people to
voluntarily donate their organs and undermine the voluntary donor system . . . .”27
On the theory that incentives would replace altruism as the driving reason for
donation, the government’s briefing further warned of downstream consequences,
including undue inducements for poor people to donate, motivations for ineligible
donors to provide inaccurate medical histories, and ultimately a degradation of the
donation supply.28 The Ninth Circuit panel cited some of these concerns, suggesting
a persuasive role for motivational crowding-out in rational basis review.29
C. Legislation and Regulation
As before, the most notable area in which both legislators and regulators have
engaged with motivational crowding-out is again the case of organ and blood
donation. The salience of motivational crowding-out in this context may be amplified
due to early research on crowding-out related to blood donation in the 1970s; it is
therefore unsurprising that lawmakers and administrators cite motivational
crowding-out concerns directly as a basis for imposing legal rules. As described
above, the 1984 NOTA firmly criminalized compensation for organ donation. This
formalized a longstanding interpretation of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, the
NOTA’s predecessor previously adopted in all fifty states, to render the commercial
transfer of organs illegal.30 Now in the wake of the Flynn decision, the exemption of
blood marrow donation by apheresis may be short-lived. In October 2013, the
Department of Health and Human Services published a notice of proposed
rulemaking to include blood marrow donation by apheresis in its ban on
compensating donors, noting the Congressional intent to “ban the commodification

26. Id. at 859–62.
27. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss at 17, Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852 (9th
Cir. 2012) (No. 2:09-cv-07772-VBF-AJW); accord Brief for Appellee at 12, Flynn v. Holder,
684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-55643).
28. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss at 25, Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852
(9th Cir. 2012) (No. 2:09-cv-07772-VBF-AJW).
29. Flynn, 684 F.3d at 859–62. For a fuller description of this case, see John A. Robertson,
Paid Organ Donations and the Constitutionality of the National Organ Transplant Act, 40
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221 (2013); Recent Cases, Health Law—Organ Compensation—Ninth
Circuit Holds that Compensation for Blood Stem Cell Transplant Procedure Does Not Violate
National Organ Transplant Act—Flynn v. Holder, No. 10-55643, 2012 WL 1001300 (9th Cir.
Mar. 27 2012)., 125 HARV. L. REV. 2201 (2012).
30. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss at 11, Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852 (9th
Cir. 2012) (No. 2:09-cv-07772-VBF-AJW); accord Sara Krieger Kahan, Note, Incentivizing
Organ Donation: A Proposal to End the Organ Shortage, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 757, 763
(2009).
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of [blood marrow cells] . . ., curb opportunities for coercion and exploitation,
encourage altruistic donations, and decrease the likelihood of disease transmission
resulting from paid donations.”31 Motivational crowding-out, along with its
downstream effects, remains a primary concern animating this regulatory regime.
Also in health law, concern about motivational crowding-out has influenced
policy discussions over the structure of Medicare payments for physicians, including
paying physicians based on quality of care.32 Such value-based payment (VBP)
programs have drawn criticism based on their potential to crowd out providers’
intrinsic motivations to provide high-quality care, including professional norms and
dedication to public service.33 Medicare had previously implemented an incentivebased approach in its payments to hospitals under the Affordable Care Act, including
Accountable Care Organization (ACO) demonstration projects and the Hospital
Value-Based Purchasing Program.34 Despite the fear of crowding-out, value-based
payment is now coming to individual physician payments as well as hospital
payments under Medicare. The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of
2015 provided for incentive-based payment for eligible health care providers,
including rewards based on quality, resource use, improvements in practice, and use
of electronic health records.35 Motivational crowding-out is a familiar objection to
innovations in incentive pay, and evaluation of these new payment models will be
instructive.
D. Legal Scholarship
Concerns about crowding-out effects are thriving in legal scholarship. Although
a comprehensive review is not the purpose of this Article, a selection of legal areas
that have considered crowding-out will illustrate the relevance of the phenomenon
across the field.
1. Health Law and Policy
As the prior discussions of Flynn v. Holder and pay-for-performance may suggest,
health law has been at the center of scholarship on motivational crowding-out effects.
Compensation for blood and organ donation has long been a lightning rod.36

31. Change to the Definition of “Human Organ” under Section 301 of the National Organ
Transplant Act of 1984, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,810, 60,812 (proposed Oct. 2, 2013) (codified in 42
C.F.R. pt. 121).
32. SGR: Date, Measures, and Models; Building a Future Medicare Physician Payment
System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. for Health of the Comm. on House Energy and
Commerce, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Robert A. Berenson, Institute Fellow, Urban
Institute).
33. See id. at 124.
34. See JULIA JAMES, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTH POLICY BRIEF:
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE (2012), https://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?
brief_id=78 [https://perma.cc/2Q2Z-SFX7].
35. Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1305
(2012).
36. See, e.g., DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL
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Similarly, the issue of paying healthcare providers based on performance metrics has
dogged health systems in a range of countries, 37 and some have suggested that
payment systems can “demoralize” individual physicians and healthcare
institutions.38 These programs include incentives for overall performance quality as
well as specific care practices such as medication prescription. 39
Recent years have also seen a rise in incentive programs managed by health
insurers, by employers (i.e., wellness programs), 40 and sometimes by individuals
themselves (i.e., commitment contracts),41 which arrange financial incentives based
on the achievement of health status goals or behaviors such as medication
compliance.42 The use of extrinsic incentives to improve individual health behaviors
has been particularly attractive in the United States, and current efforts often include
financial rewards for health behaviors ranging from keeping doctors’ appointments
to drug addiction treatment.43 One illustration of these programs with a governmental
principal appears in Iowa’s Section 1115 demonstration waiver, which has organized
its expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act.44 Under this waiver,
enrollees with income above fifty percent of the federal poverty level must pay

LIMITS OF MARKETS 192–95 (2010); WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR
COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS (Sally Satel ed., 2009); David Horton, Indescendibility, 102
CALIF. L. REV. 543, 574–75 (2014) (describing crowding-out theory as applied to organ
donation).
37. See Frank Eijkenaar, Martin Emmert, Manfred Scheppach & Oliver Schöffski, Effects
of Pay for Performance in Health Care: A Systematic Review of Systematic Reviews, 110
HEALTH POL’Y 115, 116 (2013); see also Adam Oliver & Lawrence D. Brown, Incentivizing
Professionals and Patients: A Consideration in the Context of the United Kingdom and the
United States, 36 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 59 (2011). For additional empirical evidence on
the effectiveness of pay-for-performance programs on improving healthcare quality, see
Meredith B. Rosenthal & Richard G. Frank, What Is the Empirical Basis for Paying for Quality
in Health Care?, 63 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 135 (2006) (finding mixed results).
38. BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY TO DO
THE RIGHT THING 182–84, 199–211 (2010). This is of particular concern when the provider’s
definition of “quality” care differs from the performance metric. Eijkenaar et al., supra note
37, at 116.
39. Pam Belluck, For Forgetful, Cash Helps the Medicine Go Down, N.Y. TIMES (June
13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/health/14meds.html [https://perma.cc/3TCU
-6JV2] (noting that “93,000 doctors are in Aetna’s ‘pay for performance’ program; bonuses
average three percent to five percent of a practice’s base income.”).
40. Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs and Lifestyle
Discrimination—The Legal Limits, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 198 (2008); Harald Schmidt,
David A. Asch & Scott D. Halpern, Fairness and Wellness Incentives: What Is the Relevance
of Process-Outcome Distinction?, 55 PREVENTIVE MED. S118 (2012).
41. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, THE $500 DIET 17–35 (2010) [hereinafter, AYRES, THE $500
DIET] (describing the use of a commitment contract to lose weight in order to avoid forfeiting
$500).
42. Belluck, supra note 39.
43. Oliver & Brown, supra note 37, at 78.
44. Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Mikki Stier,
Medicaid Dir., Iowa Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 16–19 (Oct. 27, 2017),
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115
/downloads/ia/ia-wellness-plan-ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/LML9-EGR4].
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premiums for Medicaid coverage and dental care, but these premiums will be waived
based on the completion of annual risk assessments and preventive exam visits. 45
Wellness programs of this nature, however, have inspired concern on the basis that
they may crowd out individuals’ self-care motivations, leading to worse health
behaviors after they are withdrawn.
Crowding has also been a concern for governmental programs that provide
publicly funded incentives—also called conditional cash transfer programs—for
families to engage in welfare-promoting activities such as sending children to school,
receiving vaccinations, or utilizing other health interventions. 46 The use of
conditional cash transfer programs is comparatively rare in the United States, but
efforts have included New York’s Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards program to
incentivize behaviors linked to improved health and reduced poverty, such as uptake
and maintenance of health insurance and receipt of preventive dental care. 47 Such
programs have seen beneficial effects on behaviors such as education and clinic visits
in other nations.48
Financial incentives for the conduct of human subjects research have also
attracted attention in health law, including incentives for human subjects,49 and
financial penalties for medical researchers who engage in unethical research
activities.50
2. Environmental Law
Like health law, environmental law has witnessed an increase in experimentation
with financial incentives to motivate improvements in individual behavior. In

45. Id. at 6.
46. For a description, see Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier & Pedro Rey-Biel, When and Why
Incentives (Don’t) Work To Modify Behavior, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 193 (2011) (citing Jere
R. Behrman, Piyali Sengupta & Petra Todd, Progressing through PROGRESA: An Impact
Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment in Rural Mexico, 54 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL
CHANGE 237 (2005)); see also Julio Frenk, Bridging the Divide: Global Lessons from
Evidence-Based Health Policy in Mexico, 368 LANCET 954 (2006).
47. JAMES A. RICCIO, NADINE DECHAUSAY, DAVID GREENBERG, CYNTHIA MILLER,
ZAWADI RUCKS & NANDITA VERMA, TOWARD REDUCED POVERTY ACROSS GENERATIONS:
EARLY FINDINGS FROM NEW YORK CITY’S CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAM (2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1786981 [https://perma.cc/6GYF-LS4Y].
48. See Mylene Lagarde, Andy Haines & Natasha Palmer, Conditional Cash Transfers
for Improving Uptake of Health Interventions in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A
Systematic Review, 298 JAMA 1900 (2007); Oliver & Brown, supra note 37, at 79 (citing Saul
S. Morris, Rafael Flores, Pedro Olinto & Juan Manuel Medina, Monetary Incentives in
Primary Health Care and Effects on Use and Coverage of Preventive Healthcare Interventions
in Rural Honduras: Cluster Randomised Trial, 364 LANCET 2030 (2004)); see also Gary
Charness & Uri Gneezy, Incentives To Exercise, 77 ECONOMETRICA 909 (2009).
49. See RUTH W. GRANT, STRINGS ATTACHED: UNTANGLING THE ETHICS OF INCENTIVES
113 (2012); ALFIE KOHN, PUNISHED BY REWARDS: THE TROUBLE WITH GOLD STARS, INCENTIVE
PLANS, A’S, PRAISE, AND OTHER BRIBES 86 (1999).
50. See Yuval Feldman, Rebecca Gauthier & Troy Schuler, Curbing Misconduct in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Insights from Behavioral Ethics and the Behavioral Approach to
Law, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 620, 624 (2013).
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environmental policy, crowding-out of environmentalist motivations has been
predicted for tradeable emission rights, environmental taxes or emission charges,
governmental subsidies, and restrictive regulations.51 Stephanie Stern has noted that
motivational crowding-out may undermine governmental incentives for private
landowners to engage in conservation activity. 52 Some evidence suggests that social
sanctions are more potent in this field than economic incentives; for example, people
who are paid a small rebate for recycling bottles may be less willing to do so,
compared to people in jurisdictions that do not pay rebates but where nonrecycling
is a social error.53 Another environmental initiative that raised crowding-out concerns
was the Spare the Air program in San Francisco, which provided free transit fares on
days with poor air quality to reduce car pollution by commuters. 54 An empirical
evaluation of this program found that the free fares actually led to an increase in car
trips, paradoxically transforming it into a “pay-for-pollution” incentive.55 Even when
incentives are voluntary, such as when consumers voluntarily pay to offset their
environmentally harmful behavior, the introduction of market pricing may
nonetheless undermine intrinsic motivations to behave in an environmentally
responsible way.56
3. Employment Law and Executive Compensation
Given the principal-agent problems that saturate employment law and the
regulation of professions, discussion about motivational crowding-out is well
developed in the field. Compensation for executive performance is among the most

51. See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Environmental Morale and Motivation, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 412–22 (Alan
Lewis ed., 2008); see also Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating
Individual Behaviors That Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1114–26 (2012); Jason
F. Shogren, WAEA Keynote Address Behavioral Environmental Economics: Money Pumps &
Nudges, 37 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 349, 350–57 (2012).
52. See Stephanie Stern, Encouraging Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral
Analysis of Financial Incentives, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 541, 566–67, 567 n.156 (2006).
53. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All, 115 Q.J. ECON. 791,
805 (2000); see also Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May
Undermine “The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic Experiments, 320 SCI. 1605,
1609 (2008); Sung-Ha Hwang & Samuel Bowles, Are Incentives Overused in Cases Where
They Crowd Out Pro-social Motivations? 21 (Nov. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.hec.unil.ch/documents/seminars/deep/358.pdf
[https://perma.cc/436M-G2Y6]
(citing Elisabeth Rosenthal, Motivated by a Tax, Irish Spurn Plastic Bags, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
2, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/02/world/europe/02bags.html [https://perma.cc/
78J2-A7DB]).
54. See Steven E. Sexton, Paying for Pollution? How General Equilibrium Effects
Undermine the “Spare the Air” Program, 53 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 553, 554 (2012).
55. Id. at 573. The program also found large increases in discretionary (noncommuting)
trips on free-transit days, and newspapers reported increases in passengers going to shopping
and leisure destinations on these days. Id. This is consistent with crowding-out concerns about
agent selection effects. See infra Section II.A.4.
56. See Note, Uncommon Goods: On Environmental Virtues and Voluntary Carbon
Offsets, 123 HARV. L. REV. 2065, 2073–75 (2010).
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visible and studied categories of incentive, and many authors have considered
whether incentive-based pay may impair employees’ moral preferences57 and other
motivations to serve the firm.58 Other scholarship has considered the impact of
performance-based pay for government agency administrators (including merit pay
under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978),59 incentives for other public-sector
employees,60 incentives for whistle-blowing behavior (including incentives under the
Dodd-Frank Act),61 and penalties for self-interested behavior by governmental
officials62—all on the theory that these extrinsic incentives and constraints may
undermine other motivations for good behavior. Given empirical research suggesting
that employees’ protection of trade secrets is largely motivated by concerns of
morality and fairness, rather than penalties for trade secret disclosure, 63 crowdingout effects may be productively investigated in this area as well. Another intriguing
focus of this scholarship has included whether financial incentives for firms to
maintain ethics and compliance programs (as provided by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s Organizational Guidelines) may crowd out moral and social
motivations for developing ethical firm cultures, and whether ethics programs

57. See Stout, supra note 1; Barry Schwartz, The Dark Side of Incentives, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 12, 2009, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009
-11-12/the-dark-side-of-incentives [https://perma.cc/5Y3P-LMHS] (arguing that incentives
may “strip the moral dimension away from the people making big decisions”).
58. See Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, The False Promise of Risk-Reducing Incentive
Pay: Evidence from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation, 38 J. CORP. L. 53, 79
(2012); Nina Walton, Crowding Theory and Executive Compensation, 13 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 429, 442 (2012); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, The Social Reform of
Banking, 39 J. CORP. L. 459, 474 (2014).
59. See David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, Principal-Agent Problems, and
Redundancy, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1823, 1847–49 (2006); see also KOHN, supra note 49, at
125–26 (noting performance incentives for civil servants in federal agencies under the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978; evaluations found that the pay may not have affected
organizational performance, and most managers surveyed believed that the financial
incentives would not lead to increased effort).
60. See Kirsten Bregn, Detrimental Effects of Performance-Related Pay in the Public
Sector? On the Need for a Broader Theoretical Perspective, 13 PUB. ORG. REV. 21, 21–22
(2013).
61. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes,
Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 605,
616 (2014); Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, Motivating Environmental Action in a Pluralistic
Regulatory Environment: An Experimental Study of Framing, Crowding Out, and Institutional
Effects in the Context of Recycling Policies, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 405, 411 (2012) (citing
Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151
(2010)); Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower
Program Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1235, 1275–
78 (2014); Emad H. Atiq, Note, Why Motives Matter: Reframing the Crowding Out Effect of
Legal Incentives, 123 YALE L.J. 1070, 1097–98 (2014).
62. See Adrian Vermeule, Precautionary Principles in Constitutional Law, 4 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 181, 207 (2012).
63. See Yuval Feldman, The Expressive Function of Trade Secret Law: Legality, Cost,
Intrinsic Motivation, and Consensus, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 177, 202–03 (2009).
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themselves crowd out employees’ moral and social motivations for ethical
behavior.64
Also writing in employment law and corporations, Nina Walton has identified
crowding-out as an explanation for rising executive compensation in the United
States; if financial incentives crowd out an executive’s desire to act in the
corporation’s benefit (e.g., preferences for reciprocity or fairness), the firm must
increase the incentive to obtain a desirable level of executive effort.65 In subsequent
years, “[p]rincipals will be willing to grant large incentive because they understand
that the previous use of incentives has severely dampened feelings such as loyalty,
fairness, and reciprocity.”66 The crowding-out effects of incentive pay are amplified,
she suggests, by professional education that teaches future executives that “managers
cannot be trusted unless they are given the appropriate incentives.” 67 Walton has
applied this reasoning to the special case of incentive pay in retention contracts for
firms that were bailed out by the U.S. government during the financial crash, such as
American International Group, Inc. (AIG); prior bonuses had already crowded out
intrinsic concern for the firm, while retention bonuses implicitly acknowledged that
crowding-out had already occurred and further undermined employees’ “sense of
obligation to come to work without being paid a bonus.” 68 Voluntary efforts to
recover some bonus funds from employees were unsuccessful, leading to the
suggestion that it may be impossible to recover intrinsic motivations that predated
incentives.69
4. Torts
The most salient discussion of crowding-out law in torts scholarship has centered
on the worry that compensation, market rewards,70 or mandates71 for Good Samaritan
behavior and salvage activities may crowd out altruism. The imprint of these
crowding-out concerns may be seen in state Good Samaritan laws. Private citizens
acting as Good Samaritans often receive immunity or benefit from a lower standard
of care while attempting to rescue others (compared to the ordinary standard of care
under the tort system);72 in some states, however, the acts of rescue must be
demonstrably “gratuitous and without expectation of compensation” to qualify for

64. See Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J.
CORP. L. 769, 822–25 (2014).
65. Walton, supra note 58, at 430–31.
66. Id. at 431.
67. Id. at 448.
68. Id. at 350–51.
69. Id. at 454–55.
70. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans,
and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 98–100
(1978).
71. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102
MICH. L. REV. 71, 79 (2003).
72. Victoria Sutton, Is There a Doctor (and a Lawyer) in the House? Why Our Good
Samaritans Laws Are Doing More Harm Than Good for a National Public Health Security
Strategy: A Fifty-State Survey, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 261, 282–88 (2010).
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this immunity.73 Torts scholars have also suggested that the entire torts system for
deterring harm to strangers may displace moral obligations to protect others. 74
5. Contracts
In contract law, one modeling study has examined whether the specification of
“complete” contracts and enforcement of contractual agreements may crowd out
reciprocity motivations75 or trust in the marketplace.76 This has been echoed in
literature arguing that contract structures may crowd out trust generally (including
perhaps in noncontractual as well as contractual relationships)77, because agents
acting under legal constraints cannot reliably signal that they are personally
trustworthy.78 In the case of coauthored creative works, one scholar has suggested
that the existence of a contractual arrangement between coauthors may either crowd
out or crowd in the motivation to collaborate, depending on how the parties view the
contract.79 Another has specifically discussed whether the use of contracts in marital
relationships may crowd out trustworthiness between spouses. 80 A recent modeling
study has also noted that the presence of courts can encourage parties to continue

73. Id. at 277.
74. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations:
Comment on Feldman, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 61–63 (2011) (suggesting that civil
penalties provided by tort law crowded out Ford’s moral imperative to correct malfunctioning
gas caps on the Pinto model); see also Bruno Deffains & Claude Fluet, Legal Liability When
Individuals Have Moral Concerns, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 930, 930 (2012); Joseph C. Storch,
3-D Printing Your Way Down the Garden Path: 3-D Printers, the Copyrightization of Patents,
and a Method for Manufacturers To Avoid the Entertainment Industry’s Fate, 3 N.Y.U. J.
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 249, 271 (2014) (suggesting that lawsuits against students sharing
music sharing crowded out moral motivations to pay for content).
75. See Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, The Hidden Costs of Control, 96 AM. ECON. REV.
1611, 1613 (2006); Florian Herold, Contractual Incompleteness as a Signal of Trust, 68
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 180, 188 (2010).
76. Iris Bohnet, Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract
Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131, 131 (2001); Alessandra
Cassar, Giovanna d’Adda & Pauline Grosjean, Institutional Quality, Culture, and Norms of
Cooperation: Evidence from Behavioral Field Experiments, 57 J.L. & ECON. 821, 821–22
(2014).
77. See Brent Simpson & Kimmo Eriksson, The Dynamics of Contracts and Generalized
Trustworthiness, 21 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 59, 74 (2009) (also cited by M. Neil Browne &
Katherine S. Fister, The Intriguing Potential of Postnuptial Contract Modifications, 23
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 187, 196 n.49 (2012)).
78. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1491–92 (2005) (citing studies
demonstrating that extrinsic incentives, including legal environments, can undermine trust and
reciprocity).
79. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1747–48
(2014).
80. See Browne & Fister, supra note 77, at 196–200 (noting this concern but nonetheless
arguing that trustworthiness is often insufficient, and that marital contracts may have a
stabilizing effect).
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dealing with individuals who have breached prior agreements, thereby crowding out
reputational enforcement mechanisms for cooperative agreements. 81
6. Charitable Activity and Public Goods
Because crowding-out concerns often focus on the erosion of altruism,
scholarship has raised crowding-out questions in connection with tax breaks for
charitable contributions,82 pro bono requirements for attorneys,83 mandatory rules for
charitable conduct,84 and community service requirements for high school students. 85
This category also includes the potential that giving for-profit firms subsidies to
engage in charitable work will crowd out intrinsic motivation for employees to work
for charitable organizations instead of for-profit firms.86 An analogous area is
individual contributions to public goods. Research on motivational crowding-out has
examined the use of financial incentives or penalties to motivate contributions, such
as whether financial incentives influence citizens’ willingness to accept a NIMBY
project—such as a nuclear waste repository—in their community for the greater
good.87 Motivational crowding-out research has also examined the effect of
mandated contributions, with similar concerns.88
7. Tax Law
Tax compliance is another area subject to motivational crowding-out effects. On
the theory that individual citizens may pay taxes due to intrinsic motivations, such
as civic duty or a preference for following the rule of law, “distrusting” systems of

81. Scott E. Masten & Jens Prüfer, On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement
Institutions: Communities and Courts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 361–62 (2014).
82. See Wendy C. Gerzog, Alms to the Rich: The Façade Easement Deduction, 34 VA.
TAX REV. 229, 234 n.14 (2014); Atiq, supra note 61, at 1097–98. These concerns may also
apply to the reduction in death duties to allow for gifts made to charity. See 26 U.S.C. § 2055
(2012); see also YMCA v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47, 50 (1924) (explaining § 2055 as a “deal” made
with testators before death, offering reduced death duties in exchange for altruistic gifts).
83. See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tending the Generous Heart: Mandatory Pro Bono and
Moral Development, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 460–61 (2001).
84. See Brian Sheppard & Fiery Cushman, Evaluating Norms: An Empirical Analysis of
the Relationship Between Norm-Content, Operator, and Charitable Behavior, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 55, 79–80 (2010).
85. See Mark S. Sobus, Mandating Community Service: Psychological Implications of
Requiring Prosocial Behavior, 19 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 153, 153–54 (1995).
86. See Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1222–25 (2010)
(concluding that the inability to rely on image and self-image motivations will require firms
to pay higher wages and monitor employees more intensively for self-dealing, compared to
the costs of current nonprofit firms carrying out charity work).
87. See Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 3, at 746–47; Bruno S. Frey, Felix
Oberholzer-Gee & Reiner Eichenberger, The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals
and Markets, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1297, 1297–98 (1996); Kahan, supra note 71, at 85–89.
88. See Andrew F. Reeson & John G. Tisdell, Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods:
An Experimental Test of Motivational Crowding, 68 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 273, 273–74
(2008).
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tax enforcement that include penalties and increased surveillance may produce
motivational crowding-out. For example, several scholars have suggested that tax
evasion may increase in response to penalties for nonpayment 89 or publicized
audits.90 Tax credits, such as credits for entrepreneurs, 91 also provide countless
opportunities for understanding how such incentives affect intrinsic motivations.
8. Intellectual Property and Innovation
The intrinsic motivations driving creative activity may also be vulnerable to
crowding-out effects, and many legal scholars have expressed concern about the use
of market-based incentives, financial rewards, tax-exempt status, and intellectual
property rights for individuals and organizations engaged in innovation. 92 Several
articles have included particular concerns about motivational crowding-out in
response to state support for the arts through grants and subsidies, 93 financial
incentives and property rights relating to the development of shared goods, such as
open-source software or distributed computing projects,94 entitlements for open

89. See Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like To Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for
Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 203–04
(2013).
90. See, e.g., Feldman & Perez, supra note 61 (citing Michael Wenzel, Motivation or
Rationalisation? Causal Relations Between Ethics, Norms and Tax Compliance, 26 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 491 (2005)); Fleisig-Greene, supra note 11, at 1238–39; Kahan, supra note 71, at
83–85; Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV.
1781, 1807–08, 1813 (2000). But see Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax
Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1079–80, 1080 n.63 (2003) (rejecting the theory as
applied to publicized audits and criminal penalties for tax evasion).
91. See Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet: Wagering with the
Government as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 810
(1991).
92. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer & Christopher
Jon Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92
TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1943–44 (2014) (summarizing arguments); Wendy J. Gordon, Render
Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 90–91 (2004)
(noting “skepticism about claims that any monetization will trigger the collapse of entire fields
of emotional connection into cash calculation,” but also suggesting that awarding monetary
remedies for copyright cases “affected by the public interest” may “undermine authors’
emotional conception of their task”); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the
Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 352–55 (2013) (noting that crowding-out is not
“inevitable,” but that the design incentives for innovation should be mindful of this possibility
and seek to complement, not displace, “nonmonetary motivations”).
93. See Bruno S. Frey, State Support and Creativity in the Arts: Some New
Considerations, 23 J. CULTURAL ECON. 71, 81–82 (1999).
94. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 99–127 (2006); Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On
Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114
YALE L.J. 273, 278, 357 (2004) (noting that uncompensated social sharing arrangements may
outperform price-based and government-funded systems with equal functionality); Kahan,
supra note 71, at 93–95.
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science,95 incentives for the production of shared cultural or knowledge commons,96
and the use of market mechanisms in the music industry.97
9. Criminal Law
The use of incentives in criminal law and jury trials has also provoked crowdingout concerns. For example, Tom Tyler has suggested that the use of surveillance to
monitor and punish crime begets more surveillance, because punishment shifts
agents’ attention to “instrumental factors” that crowd out prosocial motivations like
morality and peer opinion.98 This concern recalls prior scholarship noting the
potential for criminal penalties to strengthen motivations to engage in criminal acts99
such as fraud,100 or that increased penalties and street-level policing may
inadvertently increase crime.101 More generally, others have argued that the
compensation of jurors may undermine their perceived significance of their role as a
civic responsibility102 or that civic virtue generally is crowded out by the availability
of adversary institutions for resolving disputes. 103
Tracy Meares has suggested a system of financial incentives for prosecutors,
providing case-by-case rewards in order to shape charging decisions and to motivate
adherence to ethical rules.104 This proposal is intended to harness prosecutors’
preferences not necessarily for money, but for victory and status.105 Meares has
highlighted a number of other areas where financial incentives play a role in the
criminal justice system, including rewards offered by the Secret Service106 and local
communities for information leading to arrest or convictions, or the qui tam action
under the federal False Claims Act.107 The literature on motivational crowding-out
was relatively small at the time of Meares’s proposal, but these incentive practices

95. See Liza S. Vertinsky, Making Room for Cooperative Innovation, 41 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1067, 1085–86 (2014).
96. See Wendy J. Gordon, Discipline and Nourish: On Constructing Commons, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 733, 748–49 (2010); Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How To
Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 1024–25 (2012).
97. See Benkler, supra note 94, at 342.
98. Tom R. Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, 51 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 267, 286 (2014).
99. See Sherry F. Colb, Oil and Water: Why Retribution and Repentance Do Not Mix, 22
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 59, 83 (2003).
100. Kahan, supra note 71, at 99, 101.
101. Id. at 101.
102. Evan R. Seamone, A Refreshing Jury Cola: Fulfilling the Duty To Compensate Jurors
Adequately, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 379 (2002).
103. See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 5 J. ECON. SURVEYS
589, 599 (2001) (citing studies).
104. Tracy L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion
and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995); see also Miriam H.
Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 48 (2015) (arguing that excessive oversight of
prosecutors “may . . . crowd out and undermine intrinsic motivations to comply with law”).
105. Meares, supra note 104.
106. Id. at 856 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3056(c)(1)(D) (1994)).
107. Id. at 858 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3731 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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may now be revisited with motivational crowding-out in mind. Crowding-out effects
might also be considered in relation to the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, which permits up to a one-year sentence reduction for a
defendant’s successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program; 108 Senate debate
on this provision considered the relevance of motivation to the effectiveness of drug
rehabilitation, with the concern that prisoners motivated by a mandate or sentence
reduction may derive less benefit from rehabilitation services.109 Incentives for guilty
pleas, good behavior in prison,110 or for providing information or assistance111 may
also be usefully considered through the lens of motivational crowding-out.
10. Education
Researchers in education policy and law are also attuned to motivational
crowding-out effects. Concerns in this field include the worry that an emphasis on
“extrinsic motivations” such as grades, test scores, and job prospects may crowd out
intrinsic motivations for learning, such as curiosity,112 as well as intrinsic motivations
for teaching, such as genuine concern for pupils’ development.113 These concerns
have prompted objections to New York City’s efforts to offer cash rewards for school
attendance,114 and other “dollars for scholars” programs that have taken place in the
U.S. and elsewhere.115
11. Property Law, Trusts, and Estates
Legal scholarship has considered motivational crowding-out in several areas of
property law. For example, federal and state governments offer financial incentives
to encourage private landowners to grant public access to their lands, but these have
drawn scrutiny on the basis that they may crowd out altruistic motives for providing
public access.116 One scholar has also expressed concern that “incentive trusts”
—trust funds that impose conditions on beneficiaries’ behavior with little leeway for

108. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) (2012 & Supp. V); see also Bellis v. Davis, 186 F.3d 1092
(8th Cir. 1999); Winick, supra note, 91, at 810.
109. See 140 CONG. REC. S12,356 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1994) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(“[T]he success rate for, if you will, forced drug treatment, that is, going to prison and taking
drug treatment, and voluntary drug treatment when the person raises their hand and says,
‘Please help me. I want treatment,’ is essentially the same.”).
110. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 91, at 810.
111. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b); see also supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text discussing
incentives for informants.
112. See KOHN, supra note 49; SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38, at 177–81, 187; Peter
H. Huang, Tiger Cub Strikes Back: Memoirs of an Ex-Child Prodigy about Legal Education
and Parenting, 1 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 297, 301 (2012).
113. SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38, at 177–81, 187.
114. Barry Schwartz, Money for Nothing, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/02/opinion/02schwartz.html [https://perma.cc/EH6J-G6GP].
115. For an overview of some of these programs, see IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS
26−27 (2011) [hereinafter AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS].
116. See Richard M. Hynes, Posted: Notice and the Right To Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
949, 980 (2013).
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exceptions—may train beneficiaries’ attention on money while undermining
intrinsic motivations for achievement.117
12. Other Incentives in U.S. Law and Policy
Concerns about motivational crowding-out have also influenced scholarship on
the law of democracy (discussing whether compulsory voting may crowd out civic
motivations to vote),118 international law (discussing whether formal systems for
international dispute resolution may facilitate breach by crowding out reputational
motivations to fulfill commitments),119 and communications law (considering
whether paying television broadcasters to produce more public interest broadcasting
may lead them to reduce their voluntary public interest programming activity).120
Beyond these examples of scholarly discussion about motivational crowding-out
effects, there are also many areas where crowding-out concerns may not have been
raised directly, but where further discussion in this area may be useful. Gerrit De
Geest and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci have provided a cross-disciplinary overview of
incentives used to motivate individual behavior under U.S. law, particularly in
settings characterized by complexity, specialization, and divisions of labor.121 In
addition to many of the incentives already discussed above, they have also
highlighted incentives for military recruitment, 122 bonuses for contract
performance,123 privately offered awards for recovering lost property, 124 and
incentives for submitting to regulatory takings. 125
II. HAZARDS OF MOTIVATIONAL CROWDING-OUT
As the prior section suggests, concerns about crowding-out attach to many
different proposed harms. But to date discussions of these harms have been
imprecise, not only in legal scholarship, but throughout the many fields of academic
work on this phenomenon. Scholars typically express concern about one effect (most
frequently overall disengagement), but the effects of crowding-out are far more
complex, and different consequences may be salient in different contexts. To address

117. Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41
REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 445, 489–91 (2006).
118. Fleisig-Greene, supra note 11.
119. Rachel Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace
Reputational Sanctions, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 259 (2013).
120. See Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499, 546–
47 (2000) (paying broadcasters to provide public interest programming “may provide
broadcasters with an incentive to produce less public interest broadcasting on their own than
they otherwise would, or at least to understate the amount that they would voluntarily provide.
. . . This is a pervasive problem with paying people to do good or not to do bad; the payment
may induce less of the good or more of the bad.”).
121. De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 13, at 347, 392.
122. Id. at 386.
123. Id. at 343–44, 384–85.
124. Id. at 377–78; see also Winick, supra note 91, at 820–21.
125. De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 13, at 379–81.

1130

INDIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:1109

these concerns systematically and cogently, either through incentive design or the
regulation of incentive-based policies, a full accounting of crowding-out harms is
needed.
To complement my previous work on the causes of crowding-out,126 this Part will
analyze the heterogeneous impacts of motivational crowding-out, including
attitudinal or moral effects, impacts on autonomy, and behavioral harms. This Part
focuses only on purported harms; the following Part will propose a novel raft of
benefits.
A. Behavioral Impacts
Apart from the effects of incentives on autonomy, much of the literature on
motivational crowding out focuses on its instrumental impacts. I will now consider
each of these in turn.
1. Temporarily Reduced Engagement and Playing Hard-to-Get
Reduced agent effort or engagement, including active behavior in the opposite
direction from what is incentivized, is the most obvious and frequently discussed
crowding-out effect. For example, increasing the penalties for tax evasion may result
in more tax evasion, while paying people to exercise may reduce their trips to the
gym. We might call this the “classic” crowding-out effect, and I have elsewhere
described nine mechanisms by which agents might lower their effort levels due to an
absolute reduction in intrinsic motivation. 127 Following a distinction proposed by
Samuel Bowles, some scholars separate “categorical effects,” in which crowding-out
occurs regardless of how large the incentive is, from “marginal effects,” in which the
magnitude of crowding-out depends on the incentive size.128
Temporarily reduced effort, however, can also result from a relative loss of
intrinsic motivation compared to extrinsic motivation. When extrinsic motivation
becomes the primary reason for acting, agents may be more inclined to engage in
“gaming” behavior to maximize their rewards, such as “playing hard to get.”129 A
principal who offers an incentive signals that the agent’s behavior has value in a
market.130 A sophisticated agent may interpret the incentive as a first offer, inferring
the principal is privately willing to pay more. In response, the agent may temporarily
reduce his efforts to create an artificial scarcity, thereby driving up the price of his
performance.131 Galle has called this “anticipatory and strategic crowd-out.”132 The
agent may also obscure his (privately known) intrinsic motivation, ability, or the

126. Underhill, When Extrinsic, supra note 5.
127. Underhill, Extrinsic Incentives, supra note 5.
128. See, e.g., Walton, supra note 58, at 440 (adopting this distinction). The two effects
may also occur simultaneously. Id.
129. Wendelin Schnedler & Christoph Vanberg, Playing ‘Hard To Get’: An Economic
Rationale for Crowding Out of Intrinsically Motivated Behavior 1, (Forschungsinstitut zur
Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 8108, 2014).
130. Id. at 5.
131. Id. at 7–11.
132. Galle, supra note 12, at 835.
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costs of his activity to convince the principal that higher incentives are needed. 133
Concerns about temporary or individual gaming behavior to bid up prices have
occurred elsewhere in the crowding-out literature, such as discussions about payment
for organ donation; one of the rational bases for the NOTA’s prohibition, as cited in
the Flynn decision, was that a pay-for-donation system would allow “every last cent
[to] be extracted from sick patients needful of transplants, by well-matched potential
donors making ‘your money or your life’ offers.” 134 Similarly, offering rewards to
induce tax evaders to begin paying may cause previously compliant agents to begin
evading taxes so that they might subsequently claim a reward for good behavior.135
In another intriguing example, Galle notes that during the financial crisis, the
Treasury Department considered offering financial incentives to banks to encourage
lending; public commentators warned that if they did not implement or reject the
policy immediately, banks seeking to maximize their income and ensure adoption of
the policy would refuse to lend until the subsidies were in place, which would
compound the temporary hardship. 136
To date, there has been little empirical investigation of the playing-hard-to-get
theory. One test of this phenomenon is the aforementioned Swiss study of siting a
nuclear waste repository, in which the offer of payment reduced by half the
proportion of residents who were willing to accept the facility in their town.137 The
authors considered whether the residents were simply holding out in hopes that the
government would increase its offer of compensation. They dismissed this
possibility, however, when a follow-up question found that only five percent of
respondents believed the amount was insufficient; moreover, respondents who
declined initial amounts were offered higher amounts in hypothetical scenarios, and
almost none agreed to accept more. 138
2. Sustainability and Future Engagement
Throughout the literature on crowding, a common concern is that although
external incentives may motivate behavior or produce “temporary compliance” 139 in
the short term, they may backfire in the long term, becoming “negative reinforcers

133. See Schnedler & Vanberg, supra note 129, at 8; see also Galle, supra note 12, at 813
(noting that “if carrots are on the table, producers [potential agents] should want to . . .
demonstrate[] how costly and difficult it is for them to move in the direction the government
wants”).
134. Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Sunstein, supra note 120,
at 546−47.
135. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax
Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 L. & POL’Y 102, 109 (2007).
136. Galle, supra note 12, at 835; see also id. at 820−21 (noting a similar dynamic that
may temporarily reduce voluntary emission reductions among businesses who know that the
government is considering tax incentives for this behavior).
137. Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 3.
138. Id. at 750.
139. Alfie Kohn, Why Incentive Plans Cannot Work, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1993,
at 2.
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once they are withdrawn.”140 That is, “once a reward is offered, it will be required—
and ‘expected’—every time the task has to be performed again—perhaps even in
increasing amounts. . . . [R]ewards have a ‘rachet effect.’”141 Detrimental effects on
future effort may follow if extrinsic incentives cause a permanent and absolute
reduction in intrinsic motivation.142 This may, for example, be due to endogenous
preference changes, a changed view of the task as a transaction, or changes in the
agent’s perceptions.143 It may also arise from a desire to avoid being taken advantage
of; for example, incentivized agents may view uncompensated behavior as a waste
of time.144
Long-term crowding-out is particularly problematic for incentives that are
intended to induce habit formation,145 although it is not problematic for incentives
intended to have only a temporary effect. 146 One example of the former is financial
incentives to motivate behavior among children, including reading books, obtaining
good grades, and contributing to household chores. If a child is paid to read books,
the theory goes, she indeed may read more books while the incentive is offered. 147
But once the child is an adult, she will no longer be paid to read, and she may decide
to stop reading because it is no longer financially beneficial; the incentive
permanently eroded her motivation to read. If the child had never been paid, she
might have developed a love for reading for other reasons, and she may have
continued to read in adulthood without pay. Some evidence suggests that if
undergraduate students who already visit the gym regularly are offered financial
incentives for making repeat visits, they may attend the gym less after those
incentives are removed; experimenters observed the reverse effect, however, among
nonattenders who began visiting the gym when incentivized and then continued to
do so (perhaps out of habit) after the incentives were removed.148 The experimenters
concluded that incentives “should be targeted at people who currently do not exercise
and must mandate enough practice hours for the habit to develop.” 149 Subsequent
research found that the lasting impact of incentives was stronger among participants

140. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV. ECON.
STUD. 489, 492 (2003) [hereainfter Bénabou & Tirole, Motivation] (emphasis added); see also
GRANT, supra note 49, at 115, 118; Antoine Beretti, Charles Figuières & Gilles Grolleau,
Using Money To Motivate Both “Saints” and “Sinners”: A Field Experiment on Motivational
Crowding-Out, 66 KYKLOS 63 (2013); Friedel Bolle & Philipp E. Otto, A Price Is a Signal:
On Intrinsic Motivation, Crowding-Out, and Crowding-In, 63 KYKLOS 9, 9 (2010); Charness
& Gneezy, supra note 48, at 21.
141. Bénabou & Tirole, Motivation, supra note 140, at 503.
142. See, e.g., STEPHAN MEIER, THE ECONOMICS OF NON-SELFISH BEHAVIOUR: DECISIONS
TO CONTRIBUTE MONEY TO PUBLIC GOODS 37 (2006).
143. See, e.g., Gneezy et al., supra note 46, at 193−94.
144. Stern, supra note 52, at 564.
145. For a description of two views of how incentives induce or inhibit habit formation,
see Charness & Gneezy, supra note 48, at 3−4.
146. See AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS, supra note 115, at 47.
147. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38, at 180.
148. Charness & Gneezy, supra note 48.
149. Id. at 23; see also Gneezy et al., supra note 46, at 205−06 (citing replications of the
Charness and Gneezy study).
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whose friends had also been assigned to the incentivized condition, suggesting that
social network effects may play a role in the long-term effect of incentives.150
Another theory of future performance suggests that individuals may eventually
forget their intrinsic interest in a given task; they may remember only that they
engaged in the task and obtained the reward.151 When the decision recurs, the agent
may not recall her intrinsic motivation, and she may therefore decline to engage in
the task again without an incentive. If no incentive had been offered the first time,
however, the ex post individual may rationalize her prior behavior by assuming that
she had a personally meaningful rationale, and she may be more likely to undertake
the action again.
When the incentive is a penalty, evidence from at least one well-known study
suggests that the counterproductive effects of penalizing bad behavior may be
permanent. In this experiment, a day care levied a new fine on parents who picked
up their children late; contrary to expectations, the frequency of late pickups
increased, perhaps because the fine served as a cheap “price” that crowded out
parents’ intrinsic motivations to arrive on time. 152 Although the fine was removed
several weeks later, the higher frequency of late pickups remained. 153 Similarly, a
modeling study of financial incentives for prosocial activity found that after an
incentive has decreased contributions to a public good, withdrawing the incentives
may not restore prior contribution levels; rather, withdrawing incentives altogether
at that point may even further reduce contributions because even the selfish
contributors are no longer interested.154 Taken together, these studies suggest a
concerning norm: “Once a commodity, always a commodity.” 155 Or in other words,
a change in reference point is difficult to reverse.156 Interestingly, however, Fehr and
Falk have noted that current research may conflate long-term crowding-out of
intrinsic motivation with a more fleeting “disappointment effect,” which triggers loss
aversion and negative reciprocity when a previously anticipated reward is
removed.157 Support for this idea may be found in a study of a manufacturing
company that removed a long-standing incentive plan intended to boost production
among its welders. Although production initially declined, rates of production

150. See Gneezy et al., supra note 46, at 205−06 (citing Philip Babcock & John Hartman,
Exercising in Herds: Treatment Size and Status Specific Peer Effects in a Randomized
Exercise
Intervention
(Aug.
2010)
(unpublished
research
paper),
http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~hartman/Research_papers_files/ExerciseHerd_2010_08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3S2C-H7ME]).
151. Bénabou & Tirole, Motivation, supra note 140, at 506.
152. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (2000)
[hereinafter Gneezy & Rushtichini, A Fine Is a Price].
153. Id.
154. Maarten C.W. Janssen & Ewa Mendys-Kamphorst, The Price of a Price: On the
Crowding Out and In of Social Norms, 55 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 377, 392 (2004) (also
suggesting that crowding-out of social norms may not be permanent, but that the regeneration
of a social norm may take a long time).
155. Gneezy & Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, supra note 152, at 14.
156. Gneezy & Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All, supra note 53.
157. Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON.
REV. 687, 717 (2002).
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recovered over the ensuing months and ultimately matched earlier rates of
productivity.158 Studies are needed to evaluate this possibility.
3. Reduced Quality of Performance: Choking, Distraction, Performance
Orientation, and Gaming
Another concern is whether the reduction in intrinsic motivation will change or
degrade the nature of individuals’ activity. 159 Empirical research has shown that
intrinsic motivation is positively correlated with learning, 160 curiosity,161
satisfaction,162 sustainable behavior change,163 performance quality, and (to a lesser
degree) performance quantity for tasks that have a quantity component. 164 Concerns
about detrimental impacts of incentives on performance quality are more likely to
arise when crowding represents a relative loss of intrinsic motivation compared to
extrinsic motivation; that is, where people previously engaged in an activity
primarily because of some intrinsic reason, an extrinsic reward or penalty may
change their balance of motivations, such that the extrinsic motivations play a larger
role than intrinsic motivation in driving behavior.165 The comprehensive metaanalysis of crowding effects across 183 primary studies found that “intrinsic
motivation mattered more for quality than extrinsic incentives[,] and extrinsic
incentives explained more of the variance in quantity performance criteria than did
intrinsic motivation.”166 This may be because quality requires more complex and
skillful tasks, which require high engagement and even personal investment; tasks
measured primarily by quantity are often less cognitively demanding. 167 The three
explanations most frequently given for reduced quality of performance in the
presence of rewards are choking, distraction, and a change in focus from “progress”
to “performance” orientation.
Reduced quality of performance in the presence of high-stakes incentives can be
explained as “choking”:168 that is, when individuals are highly motivated by large

158. Kohn, supra note 139, at 3−4.
159. See, e.g., id. at 3; see also KOHN, supra note 59, at 124.
160. Frey, supra note 10, at 435−36.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Marianne Promberger & Theresa M. Marteau, When Do Financial Incentives Reduce
Intrinsic Motivation? Comparing Behaviors Studies in Psychological and Economic
Literatures, 32 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 950, 950 (2013) (citing Marie Johnston & Falko F.
Sniehotta, Financial Incentives To Change Patient Behavior, 15 J. HEALTH SERV. RES. &
POL’Y 131−32 (2010)); Winick, supra note 91, at 769.
164. Christopher P. Cerasoli, Jessica M. Nicklin & Michael T. Ford, Intrinsic Motivation
and Extrinsic Incentives Jointly Predict Performance: A 40-Year Meta-Analysis, PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1, 8 (2014).
165. Even if intrinsic motivation does not diminish or disappear, it may simply have a
weaker link to performance. Id. at 3.
166. Id. at 17 (documenting these effects both with and without the presence of explicit
incentives).
167. Id. at 3.
168. For an overview of choking behavior, see SIAN BEILOCK, CHOKE: WHAT THE SECRETS
OF THE BRAIN REVEAL ABOUT GETTING IT RIGHT WHEN YOU HAVE TO (2010) (also cited by
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incentives, they may exhibit worse performance on skill-based tasks (particularly
those involving cognitive skills), although perhaps not on tasks that involve effort
alone.169 Mechanisms proposed for this effect include suggestions that large
incentives prompt greater self-consciousness, an excessively narrow focus of
attention, or an excess of arousal.170 On its face, choking will look indistinguishable
from an absolute loss of intrinsic motivation: in both cases, the introduction of a
financial incentive may result in comparatively worse performance. But choking
behavior is actually an effect of a relative reduction in intrinsic motivation. Here, the
incentive becomes the primary driver of behavior, and individuals are too motivated
in response171: their desire to obtain the large prize hampers the exercise of cognitive
skill required to perform the task. Choking effects cannot be remedied by increasing
the size of the incentive; the problem in choking is precisely that the incentive is
already too high.
A second problem is that rewards may be distracting—they divert the agent’s
attention away from the task and toward the reward or penalty. 172 Even if the
incentive does not interfere with motivation, it may interfere with the agent’s ability
to perform well. Indeed, to incentivize creative tasks, it may be preferable to use
small rewards, or large rewards that are less salient, such as rewards that are placed
out of sight during the performance of the task. 173 Kelli Alces and Brian Galle have
discussed this in the context of availability bias, in which agents become so focused
on one item (reward) that cognitive performance on other tasks suffers; they further
note that agents, such as executives, may focus so much on their largest or most
salient incentive that manipulating other incentives may not influence
performance.174 One example of this may be the extent to which command-andcontrol regulations divert agents’ attention to compliance requirements and avoiding
penalties, thereby undermining risk-taking and resources for innovation or quality
improvement; writing in the area of health care management, Robert Gatter suggests
that this effect may be seen as an instance of crowding-out.175
A third mechanism by which extrinsic incentives can reduce performance quality
is that they change agents’ focus from “progress” (or “mastery”) to “performance.” 176

Emir Kamenica, Behavioral Economics and Psychology of Incentives, 4 ANN. REV. ECON. 427,
432 (2012)); see also Buccafusco et al., supra note 92, at 1922.
169. Dan Ariely, Uri Gneezy, George Loewenstein & Nina Mazar, Large Stakes and Big
Mistakes 19 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 05-11, 2005); see also Gneezy
et al., supra note 46, at 193.
170. Ariely et al., supra note 169, at 3−4; see also Kamenica, supra note 168 (citing
examples of choking behavior for a range of tasks).
171. Ariely et al., supra note 169, at 1−2.
172. Bénabou & Tirole, Motivation, supra note 140, at 495 (citing research by John Condry
& James Chambers, Intrinsic Motivation and the Process of Learning, in THE HIDDEN COST
OF REWARD: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN MOTIVATION 66 (Mark R.
Lepper & David Greene eds., 1978)); Robert Eisenberger & Judy Cameron, Detrimental
Effects of Reward: Reality or Myth?, 51 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1153, 1161−62 (1996).
173. Eisenberger & Cameron, supra note 172, at 1162.
174. Alces & Galle, supra note 58, at 79.
175. Robert Gatter, Faith, Confidence, and Health Care: Fostering Trust in Medicine
Through Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 395, 443 (2004).
176. SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38, at 184−88; Bénabou & Tirole, Motivation, supra
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Performance orientation may lead to excessive emphasis on immediate rewards at
the expense of long-run benefits.177 For example, people paid to solve problems may
select easier problems, and people paid to read books may select those that are shorter
and easier.178 In education, some have argued that merit scholarships incentivize
higher grades, but also lead students to select easier courses to safeguard their
grades.179 A randomized trial of an incentive scheme found that once children had
obtained the maximum annual reward for reading achievement, their subsequent
reading performance declined compared to those who had never been incentivized.180
Where intellectual property protection is available for academic science, some have
suggested that financial incentives may lead academics to move their research
programs toward commercially marketable lines of inquiry.181 These may each be
viewed as an example of “gaming” behavior, however innocuous—in every case,
“people whose livelihoods are based on an index will figure out how to manipulate
it.”182 A complementary concern is that reward-focused individuals may fear
revealing signs of weakness or incompetence, making them less likely to seek help
from the principal; without help, their progress may suffer. 183 This poses problems
for both short- and long-term performance quality and skill development.
When agents are providing services to third parties, loss of performance quality
can lead to negative externalities. In health care, for example, pay-for-performance
strategies condition some percentage of provider compensation based on indicators
of quality, resource use, and patient-reported outcomes; one common concern about
such programs is that they induce healthcare providers to select against high-risk,
severely ill, or noncompliant patients that could count against performance
metrics.184 Theorists have also expressed worry that these pay-for-performance
programs lead providers to “focus disproportionately on aspects of care that are
incentivized and possibly neglect other important aspects that are not,” and
rewarding providers based on metrics may also create unintended incentives for
manipulating data or gaming systems to maximize rewards. 185 Over the long term,

note 140, at 495; see also Bregn, supra note 60, at 22; Charness & Gneezy, supra note 48, at
21.
177. Kohn, supra note 139, at 6.
178. See SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38, at 180; Frey & Jegen, supra note 103, at
596.
179. Gneezy et al., supra note 46, at 198 (citing Christopher Cornwell, David B. Mustard
& Deepa J. Sridhar, The Enrollment Effects of Merit-Based Financial Aid: Evidence from
Georgia’s HOPE Program, 24 J. LAB. ECON. 761 (2006)).
180. Eric P. Bettinger, Paying To Learn: The Effect of Financial Incentives on Elementary
School Test Scores (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 16333, 2008),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16333.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK4R-CH6M].
181. See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 96, at 1025 n.198 (citing Pierre Azoulay, Wavery
Ding & Toby Stuart, The Impact of Academic Patenting on the Rate, Quality and Direction of
(Public) Research Output, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 637 (2009)).
182. Schwartz, supra note 57.
183. Kohn, supra note 139, at 6.
184. SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38, at 182–83; Eijkenaar et al., supra note 37, at 115–16.
185. Eijkenaar et al., supra note 37, at 116; see also Priscilla Magrath & Mark Nichter,
Paying for Performance and the Social Relations of Health Care Provision: An
Anthropological Perspective, 75 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1778, 1780 (2012); Oliver & Brown, supra
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these effects of relative crowding-out may exacerbate healthcare inequalities.186
Empirical evidence for each of these concerns (selecting against high-risk patients,
neglecting unincentivized care, and gaming) is mixed.187 Similar dynamics may
occur when teachers or schools are incentivized on the basis of their pupils’
standardized test results, leading them to focus only on marginal students capable of
improving their performance to a passing standard, rather than highly talented or
highly challenged students.188
4. Agent Selection Effects
A fourth concern about crowding is that introducing a financial incentive will
change the distribution of individuals who engage in the behavior of interest. For
example, when incentives increase for a given behavior, particularly a prosocial
behavior, they may repel “more public-spirited agents” while attracting “greedy”
people who may care less about the underlying cause.189 This cumulative impact can
occur only when an incentive is available to all comers—or at least to a population
of individuals not already engaged in the behavior at baseline. Even if the absolute
number of individuals engaging in the behavior does not change (i.e., enough selfish
people join in to counteract the loss of generous people), the rebalancing may have
several downstream impacts. These include shifting the burden of the activity,
lowering the quality of performance, and impairing the group’s image.190 Incentives
may also lead to gaming behavior that changes the identity of incentive recipients.
For example, some have argued that when subsidies are offered to people with
income below a certain threshold (e.g., as in the Affordable Care Act), it encourages
people to underreport or purposely lower their income to that threshold. 191 Several
legal scholars have also noted that when incentives are offered to stop bad behavior,
they may attract new entrants to engage in bad behavior in order to obtain payment
for stopping.192
When an incentive changes the population of agents who participate in a particular
activity, group differences may in fact shift the burden or benefits of a given activity
to a new demographic. For example, evaluations of incentives for school
achievement have found that incentives increased certification and college
attendance for girls but not boys, and increased academic performance for highability but not low-ability students.193 Another important example is once again
blood donation. I have already noted the finding that offering payment may lead to

note 37, at 80–83.
186. Eijkenaar et al., supra note 37, at 116.
187. Id. at 124–25, 127.
188. See SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38, at 177–79.
189. MEIER, supra note 142, at 37; Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and
Prosocial Behavior, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1652, 1659–60 (2006) [hereinafter Bénabou & Tirole,
Prosocial Behavior].
190. Id.
191. Galle, supra note 12, at 831.
192. Id. at 812, 820 (citing research by Coase and others).
193. Gneezy et al., supra note 46, at 198.
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reduced blood donation by women, without influencing donation rates for men; 194
survey studies also note a greater propensity for crowding-out among older and more
experienced blood donors.195 This dynamic across an entire population would
reallocate the burdens and benefits of blood donation, and some express concern that
donors motivated by incentives may be less honest about their health histories. 196
Response to monetary incentives may also depend on the setting; one survey study
suggested that Austrian blood donors may increase donation in response to
nonmonetary rewards, but Italian and Swedish donors may not. 197 Concerns about
the balance of activity benefits and harms also extend to organ donation. A
simulation study of organ donation incentives found that market incentives may
“induce the relatively poor to donate [organs] while not having a significant effect
on the choices of wealthy donors.”198 Some have suggested that paying low wages
for military service can be a way to avoid recruits with mercenary motivations. 199
Others have worried that paying for medical research participation can affect the
sample of human subjects, and therefore influence the generalizability of findings.200
5. Inefficient Competition among Principals and Agents
When principals compete for agents’ time and resources, particularly when they
are seeking agents to engage in prosocial activities, this competition can also drive
up incentives,201 exacerbating crowding-out concerns about the quality of
participation and identity of agents. This competition may produce also excessive
participation by less public-spirited or less qualified agents.202 These concerns may
be illustrated by the payment of incentives for human subjects to participate in
research. At least one study suggests that paid research subjects view their
participation as a type of employment, extending even to sharing information about

194. Carl Mellström & Magnus Johannesson, Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was
Titmuss Right?, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 845 (2008).
195. See surveyed literature in Joan Costa-Font, Mireia Jofre-Bonet & Steven T. Yen, Not
All Incentives Wash Out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited (Ctr. for
Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 1157, 2012), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/47679/1
/__libfile_REPOSITORY_Content_Centre_for_Economic_Performance_Discussion_papers
_dp1157.pdf [https://perma.cc/24Y3-87KX].
196. Danielle Chmielewski, Liliana L. Bove, Jing Lei, Ben Neville & Anish Nagpal, A
New Perspective on the Incentive-Blood Donation Relationship: Partnership, Congruency,
and Affirmation of Competence, 52 TRANSFUSION 1889, 1894 (2012).
197. Costa-Font et al., supra note 195, at 16.
198. Cary Deck & Erik O. Kimbrough, Do Market Incentives Crowd Out Charitable
Giving?, 47 J. SOCIO-ECON. 16, 21 (2013).
199. Bénabou & Tirole, Prosocial Behavior, supra note 189, at 1671.
200. For example, many studies have the investigated effect of adding incentives for
completing a survey. One study found that when incentives were offered for the completion
of an environmental behavior, respondents differed significantly by age and education. Beretti
et al., supra note 140, at 74–75.
201. Bénabou & Tirole, Prosocial Behavior, supra note 189, at 1672 n.41.
202. Id.
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different studies’ “conditions of employment.” 203 This worries some researchers,
who fear that competition for subjects will ultimately increase the cost of research
and price out low-cost studies.204 Reliance on research participation income (enabled
by access to many paying studies) may also encourage potential participants to lie
about eligibility for high-paying studies, thereby interfering with the validity of study
results.
Some have also suggested that the availability of individual rewards may harm
relationships among agents who are expected to collaborate. When rewards are in
limited supply or based on performance relative to one’s peers, agents must not only
compete for the incentive, but also continue working alongside their peers who have
won or lost.205 The negative impact on collective effort and cooperation may
outweigh benefits of the incentive in these scenarios.206 One vignette study has
examined the potential impact of awards for cooperation on research teams at a
technology institution; the study suggested that although the receipt of an award may
increase motivation to collaborate, nonreceipt of the award may also deter
disappointed losers, who reported lower subsequent motivation to cooperate with
colleagues.207
6. Spillovers and Horizontal Creep
Some have expressed concern that motivational crowding-out may affect multiple
behaviors.208 Bruno Frey and Matthias Benz refer to this as the “motivation transfer”
or “motivational spill-over” effect, by which incentives can depress motivation in
new, unincentivized areas, often by altering the nature of the relationship between
the principal and the agent.209 Horizontal creep may also be the anxiety behind
concerns about “self-regulation”; for example, Deci, Ryan, and Koestner suggest that
“the primary negative of effects of rewards is that they tend to . . . undermine people’s
taking responsibility for motivating or regulating themselves.” 210 As a result,

203. Peter Davidson & Kimberly Page, Research Participation as Work: Comparing the
Perspectives of Researchers and Economically Marginalized Populations, 102 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1254 (2012).
204. See Martin Wilkinson & Andrew Moore, Inducements Revisited, 13 BIOETHICS 114,
119 (1999) (rejecting this argument).
205. Kohn, supra note 139, at 5.
206. Id.
207. Susanne Neckermann & Bruno S. Frey, Awards as Incentives 22–23 (Inst. for
Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 334, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1021208 [https://perma.cc/SZD2-G9P6].
208. MEIER, supra note 142, at 37; Beretti et al., supra note 140, at 65; Bruno S. Frey, A
Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 443 ECON. J. 1043, 1046 (1997) (warning
of “an indirect ‘motivational spill-over effect’” extending to areas beyond the focus of the
external intervention).
209. See Bruno Frey & Matthias Benz, Motivation Transfer Effect, (Inst. For Empirical
Researcg in Econs., Univ. of Zürich 2001, Working Paper) (using the term “motivation
transfer”); see also BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY 35 (1997) (using “motivational
spill-over”).
210. Edward L. Deci, Richard M. Ryan & Richard Koestner, A Meta-Analytic Review of
Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125

1140

INDIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:1109

institutions’ short-term efforts to control agents’ behavior through incentives may
cause long-term or generalized harm.211
Frey illustrates spillovers with an example from environmental policy, where
“[i]nstruments such as effluent charges or tradable permits work efficiently where
they are applied, but the induced substitute of environmental ethics by monetary
incentives leads people to protect the environment less in those areas where the
instruments are not applied.”212 Stern has also discussed how incentives may crowd
out intrinsic motivation for environmental conservation across the board, suggesting
that incentivized agents begin to view uncompensated activity as unattractive. This
loss of motivation may undermine other environmentally responsible activities or
voting decisions.213 Similar effects may obtain when extrinsic incentives are
punitive, causing undesirable behavior in unpunished areas to escalate. In other
spillover applications, Frey suggests that distrustful legal rules may undermine good
behavior by citizens, that paying for siting NIMBY projects may undermine civic
virtue for other public activities, and that incentives for employees may undermine
motivations to engage in unincentivized activity.214 Horizontal creep of motivational
crowding-out is particularly worrisome when multiple activities stem from the same
type of motivation, when they involve the same “material content” such as
environmentalism, when they activate similar cultural norms, or when they take
place in the same principal-agent relationship (such as the relationship between a
government and citizens).215 For example, one analysis suggests that changes over
time in civic norms are simultaneously linked to changes in voter participation,
charitable contributions, and social cooperation activities. 216
In addition to horizontal creep across activities, some evidence may also suggest
horizontal creep of motivational crowding-out across groups of people in geography
and time.217 This is consistent with the endogenous preferences theory of
motivational crowding-out, and it finds some support in empirical evidence. 218
B. Autonomy Impacts
In the case of negative incentives (penalties) and mandates, the autonomy
problems posed by extrinsic incentives are obvious: agents lose choice options, or

PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 659 (1999).
211. Id.
212. Frey, supra note 10, at 436 (extending the insight to “tax morale”); see also Frey &
Stutzer, supra note 51, at 412–22.
213. Stern, supra note 52, at 564–65.
214. See Frey & Benz, supra note 209, at 14–16.
215. FREY, supra note 209, at 36–37; Frey, supra note 208, at 1047; Frey & Benz, supra
note 209, at 17.
216. Frey, supra note 208, at 1047; see also Frey & Benz, supra note 209, at 17.
217. See FREY, supra note 209, at 36 (“The spill-over effect may not only relate to areas
but also to people and over time.”).
218. For example, after the residents of one Swiss community rejected an offer of
compensation for hosting nuclear waste facility, citizens of the nearby towns were also more
likely to reject the project, compared to citizens of towns further away. Frey, supra note 208,
at 1048.
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certain choices will now put them in a worse position ex post. But autonomy concerns
may also arise from positive incentives—prizes and rewards. Motivational crowdingout, as I have described it, is an absolute or relative reduction in intrinsic motivation
due to an extrinsic incentive. But this raises the somewhat semantic question of
whether crowding out is itself the loss of autonomy (in this case, a displacement of
one’s own motivations by a principal’s extrinsic incentive), or whether crowding out
is evidence of a loss of autonomy. For the purposes of this Article, I believe it may
be unnecessary to parse this distinction; it is sufficient to note that motivational
crowding-out is bound up with ways in which incentives, both positive and negative,
may impair autonomous decision making.
1. Undue Inducement, Coercion, and “Disabling Choice”
As Ruth Grant has noted, incentives are not only a form of trade, but also a form
of exerting power over the agent, somewhere between exerting force and persuading
the agent to act.219 Moreover, “when incentives are in fact deliberate tools of policy,
the equality of the parties involved ought not to be assumed.” 220 Others have worried
that incentives can stifle discussion about alternatives.221 Large incentives can indeed
limit autonomous choices; when an incentive is so attractive as to be irresistible, it
may carry disproportionate weight in the agent’s decision. Concerns about agent
autonomy in the face of positive incentives generally occur when an agent is
incentivized to do something risky or to his detriment, such as participating in
medical research222 or donating an organ,223 although other scholars have regarded
these claims with skepticism.224 Concerns of undue influence, however, have also
been raised in relation to workplace wellness programs 225 and other incentive
programs such as conditional International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans to
low-income countries.226
In his book on commitment contracting, Ian Ayres discusses the potential of
financial incentives to be “disabling” when they are large enough. When an agent
tries to bind himself to a choice, for example, setting a high price for bad behavior

219. GRANT, supra note 49, at 41.
220. Id.
221. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY 120 (2012).
222. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Ending Concerns about Undue Inducement, 32 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 100 (2004); Ari VanderWalde & Seth Kurzban, Paying Human Subjects in
Research: Where Are We, How Did We Get Here, and Now What?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
543 (2011).
223. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Transplant Tourism: The Ethics and Regulation of
International Markets for Organs, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 269 (2013).
224. See, e.g., William M. Sage, Paying Research Subjects: The US Example, in ESSAIS
CLINIQUES, QUELS RISQUES? 137 (Anne Laude & Didier Tabuteau eds., 2007); Emanuel, supra
note 222.
225. See, e.g., Matt Lamkin, Health Care Reform, Wellness Programs and the Erosion of
Informed Consent, 101 KY. L.J. 435 (2012); Kristin M. Madison, Kevin G. Volpp & Scott D.
Halpern, The Law, Policy, and Ethics of Employers’ Use of Financial Incentives To Improve
Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 450 (2011).
226. See, e.g., GRANT, supra note 49, at 71, 101–11.
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can effectively put choices out of reach.227 Although most incentives set prices for
behaviors that force the agent to internalize the full costs and benefits of his activity,
commitment contracts use super-incentives to make choices easy.228 That is, “no
rational future self” would choose to forgo the reward or incurred the penalty in lieu
of performance.229 Ayres offers many examples of these self-imposed incentives,
including a fine of $5000 for smoking one cigarette,230 a “kosher” telephone that
imposes more than a $2-per-minute surcharge for Sabbath calls,231 and medications
that induce vomiting upon ingestion of alcohol.232 Ayres’s work focuses on situations
where agents set their own incentives (i.e., the agent and principal are the same),
which do not raise autonomy concerns.233 But it is easy to imagine these types of
incentives set by a separate principal.
The Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of coercive incentives in its
jurisprudence regarding the Taxing and Spending Clause, 234 finding that the
conditions imposed on federal funds rendered “coercive” taxing and spending
programs such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 235 and the penalty for
Medicaid expansion in the Affordable Care Act. 236 This line of cases underscores
that although the point at which financial incentives become “coercion” may be
difficult to discern, Congress may indeed undermine state autonomy by offering
incentives that are too large. Many cases have noted the difficulty of line-drawing in
such cases; as Justice Cardozo noted in 1937, “the location of the point at which
pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement, would be a question of
degree,—at times, perhaps, of fact.”237 When the Court revisited this question in
South Dakota v. Dole in 1987, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion again
noted that “in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’
but that the penalty of losing five percent of highway funds in exchange for failing
to raise the drinking age did not cross the line.238 In the most recent formulation of
this rule, Chief Justice Roberts has held that although the Court has not “‘fix[ed] the
outermost line’ where persuasion gives way to coercion,” the Affordable Care Act
reached beyond this line by requiring states to expand Medicaid as a condition of

227. AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS, supra note 115, at 30.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 35.
230. Id. at 30.
231. Id. at 31.
232. Id. at 29.
233. See infra Section IV.A.
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
235. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936).
236. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); see also South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
237. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
238. 483 U.S. at 204 (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590).
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accepting any Medicaid funds.239 Concerns about undue influence have also arisen
in connection with the conditions under the No Child Left Behind Act. 240
2. Intrusiveness
In order to administer an incentive plan, the principal must also impose some
mechanism for behavior monitoring and measurement: in a word, carrots and sticks
demand surveillance. Whether the incentive is negative or positive, as Kohn has
noted, “what is essentially taking place in both approaches is that a lot of people are
getting caught.”241 Climates of “greater surveillance, evaluation, and competition”
have been independently suggested to negatively impact intrinsic motivation 242 and
limit exploration and learning.243 This has been discussed in environmental law as
“the intrusion objection,” which argues that individual behaviors that lead to
environmental harm often occur at home, and efforts to monitor and incentivize or
penalize such behavior are too invasive.244 As Adrian Vermeule has noted,
monitoring imposes costs on intrinsically motivated agents, and these costs can
exacerbate bad behavior by selecting for “knaves.” 245 Intrusiveness can thus
exacerbate crowding-out effects through the mechanisms of impaired selfdetermination and perceptions of principal hostility or agent trust, and it can increase
agent selection effects.
C. Attitudinal and Moral Impacts
Crowding-out has motivated concern not only due to its effects on short- and longterm behavior, but also for its effects on societal and individual values as an end in
themselves.
1. Societal Values
The specters of spillovers, endogenous preference adaptation, and “motivation
atrophy” have shaped the large-scale worry, expressed by scholars such as Grant,
Schwarz, Sharpe, Bowles, and Sandel, that the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation

239. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 584 (2012) (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 591). For
further discussion of the role of coercion in the Sebelius decision, see Nicole Huberfeld,
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid
and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1
(2013).
240. See, e.g., GRANT, supra note 49, at 72.
241. Kohn, supra note 139, at 7.
242. Deci et al., supra note 210, at 659; see also KOHN, supra note 59, at 79–81.
243. Kohn, supra note 139, at 5.
244. Kuh, supra note 51, at 1123 n.28 (quoting Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal
Responsibility for Improving the Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm,
33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 123 (2009)).
245. Adrian Vermeule, Precautionary Principles in Constitutional Law, 4 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 181, 207–08 (2012); Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 425–26 (2003).
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is destructive in the long term for values that should normatively shape modern
societies, such as altruism and civic duty.246 For example, Michael Sandel has written
that market mechanisms easily become “market norms” that limit the influence of
nonmarket (moral) norms. 247 Indeed, crowding-out is the cornerstone of Sandel’s
“corruption objection” to allowing incentives and transactions into areas of life
previously guided by social and moral norms. 248 Grant likewise expresses concern
that incentives limit debate over moral choices, noting that “once incentives are
introduced in certain areas and people become habituated to their use, the important
questions simply no longer arise,” citing the increased acceptability of plea
bargaining as an example.249
Scholars concerned about the erosion of societal values are often skeptical of
economic efforts to make incentives “smarter” in order to avoid and eliminate
perverse effects.250 Even if incentives have their desired behavioral effects, the
displacement of motivations such as altruism, professional duty, public service, and
civic duty may be harmful to the social fabric and to the process by which individuals
internalize democratic values.251 To cure this harm, Sandel argues that the only
remedy is a more comprehensive and inclusive social discussion about where market
incentives should and should not be deployed, and which moral values should be
preserved free of extrinsic influence.252
2. Individual Values and Self-Respect
When crowding-out produces an absolute decline in a (noble) intrinsic
motivation, the decline in that motivation may well be viewed as an attitudinal or
moral cost to the agent analogous to the change in societal values described above.
For the individual, a second potential harm lurks in the possibility of reduced selfrespect for incentivized actions. That is, the agent’s perception of undue inducement
may also reduce his or her own sense of personal achievement when an incentive has
its intended effect. In his work on commitment contracting, Ayres tells the story of a
colleague who wanted to lose weight without resorting to a commitment contract:
“‘What does it say about me as a person in terms of maturity, my self-control, if I

246. SANDEL, supra note 221; SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38; Bowles, supra note
53. This argument is shared by Emad Atiq’s discussion of the crowding-out effects of legal
incentives. Atiq, supra note 61, at 1073; see also GRANT, supra note 49, at 4 (noting the
difference between the “moralistic attitude” that guides concern over the quality of
individuals’ character, and the “Mandevillian attitude” that prompts concern over individual
choices in aggregate rather than the moral values driving behaviors).
247. This is the central argument from SANDEL, supra note 221.
248. SANDEL, supra note 221, at 110; see also Michael Sandel, Why We Shouldn’t Trust
Markets with Our Civic Life, TED (June 2013), http://www.ted.com/talks/michael_sandel
_why_we_shouldn_t_trust_markets_with_our_civic_life [https://perma.cc/H37R-N7AE].
249. GRANT, supra note 49, at 8, 76–86.
250. SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 39.
251. SAMUEL BOWLES, THE MORAL ECONOMY: WHY GOOD INCENTIVES ARE NO
SUBSTITUTE FOR GOOD CITIZENS 44 (2010); see also Bowles, supra note 53 (making a similar
argument).
252. SANDEL, supra note 221, at 14–15.
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need to be nagged[?] . . . . I’d like to think that if this is a goal that’s important to me,
I can accomplish it straight out.’”253
Although Ayres encourages us to “resist the urge to think that all
accomplishments achieved through extrinsic motivation are somehow less worthy
than those achieved solely with intrinsic desire,” many individuals may nevertheless
find their incentivized achievements to be less meaningful and even indicative of
poor self-control.254 Sandel has echoed this view. In an exposition of incentives for
health behaviors, such as weight loss and smoking, he expresses the concern that
“bribe[s] may become habit forming,” undermining the self-respect that should
motivate behavior change instead.255 Apart from the concern about whether
incentivized behavior changes are sustainable, this prompts the question of whether
individual preference changes in response to incentives may be an independent,
moral harm to the agent.
III. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF CROWDING-OUT
The previous Part considered the harms that scholars have attributed to crowdingout. In this Part, I depart from the conventional view of crowding-out harms to offer
several potential benefits of displacing intrinsic motivation, including my own
theories alongside benefits hypothesized by others. These proposed benefits are in
need of empirical testing, but they provide a theoretically appealing set of ideas that
may rehabilitate motivational crowding-out in some settings.
A. Motivation Conservation
Making choices is burdensome, and this burden takes a toll on our cognitive and
physical capacities.256 For example, although willpower may indeed be strengthened
in some ways, evidence also shows that it can be depleted, particularly in moments
of decision fatigue.257 To the extent that incentives can clarify or simplify our
choices—particularly those incentives that are irresistible—we may reap benefits by
saving our energy for other and potentially more important or personal choices. In
this way, crowding-out may help conserve motivation for situations where incentives
are unavailable.
Sandel has noted several cases where economic thinkers have made this argument,
including in lectures and written work by Sir Dennis H. Robertson, Kenneth Arrow,
and Lawrence Summers.258 In an elegant (though critical) restatement of this theory,

253. AYRES, THE $500 DIET, supra note 41, at 41.
254. Id. at 38–43.
255. SANDEL, supra note 221, at 59.
256. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose, 64 DUKE L.J. 1 (2014); Kathleen
D. Vohls, Brandon J. Schmeichel, Noelle M. Nelson, Roy F. Baumeister, Jean M. Twenge &
Dianne M. Tice, Making Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource
Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 883 (2008).
257. ROY F. BAUMEISTER & JOHN M. TIERNEY, WILLPOWER: WHY SELF-CONTROL IS THE
SECRET OF SUCCESS 88–107 (2012).
258. See SANDEL, supra note 221, at 126–30.
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Sandel writes, “By promoting policies that rely, whenever possible, on self-interest
rather than altruism or moral considerations, the economist saves society from
squandering its scarce supply of virtue.”259 Where incentives reduce the need for
intrinsic motivation, they may help us to conserve our energy for other situations. In
a more nuanced argument, Ayres has distinguished the importance of intrinsic
motivation for tasks that form part of one’s identity, compared to tasks that do not:
Using extrinsic motivation on [a] less important task might mean that I
have a greater capacity to marshal my intrinsic motivation to attend to
the things that I really care about . . . . It’s because other things are more
important in our lives that we should be open to using commitments to
help on everything else.260
But the idea of conserving motivation has drawn fire from those who believe that
continual exertion of motivation is instead self-reinforcing. Sandel, for example,
argues that “altruism, generosity, solidarity, and civic spirit . . . are more like muscles
that develop and grow stronger with exercise. One of the defects of a market-driven
society is that it lets these virtues languish.” 261
Empirical research is needed to understand whether increased engagement in
intrinsically motivated activities, such altruistic community service, strengthens or
atrophies our moral muscles. But if incentives do indeed conserve valuable
motivation for other causes, this may be an important benefit of crowding-out.
B. Displacement of Invidious Motivations
When concerns about motivational crowding-out arise in legal scholarship, they
reflect a rosy view of human nature, with concerns about laudable intrinsic
motivations such as altruism, civic duty, public service, and reciprocity. But some
motivations may not be worth preserving, 262 and at times the crowding-out of
invidious motivations may be beneficial. Such motivations may include socially
harmful interpersonal biases—including biases on the basis of race, gender, sexual
orientation, or disability—which are well-documented and pernicious influences on
opportunity and equal treatment. Debiasing strategies typically include attempts to
insulate individuals from harm, efforts to intervene directly in biased behavior, and
more subtle efforts to debias indirectly. 263 But if incentives can crowd out invidious
motivations such as bias, I have hypothesized that they may prove to be an
unexpected debiasing tool. My preliminary test of this hypothesis has yielded
unexpected contrary findings with respect to racial bias. 264 But research in this area

259. Id. at 128.
260. AYRES, THE $500 DIET, supra note 41, at 43.
261. SANDEL, supra note 221, at 130.
262. Frey, supra note 10, at 436.
263. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969
(2006).
264. I have conducted an empirical test of this phenomenon with the surprising result that
incentives may increase susceptibility to implicit bias. My hypothesis may therefore be wrong,
and the crowding-in of invidious bias may be another unexpected hazard of incentives. Kristen
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is young, and further study is needed to evaluate this claim as applied to a range of
potential motivations. The crowding out of invidious motivations is theoretically
appealing where incentives are used to promote choices that affect third parties (e.g.,
pay-for-performance arrangements, incentives for hiring employees). 265
C. Predictability
High levels of intrinsic motivation may at times be undesirable. 266 Agents with
high intrinsic motivation may be idiosyncratic and difficult to predict, which has
been suggested as a particular problem for guiding agents in the workplace. 267 Once
incentives are high enough, the disciplining or relative price effect of incentives can
override any absolute reductions in intrinsic motivation.268 This increase in the
predictability of agent behavior may be desirable in some contexts.
The surveillance and administration of incentives schemes also require metrics
for assessment. That is, incentive programs create more complete contracts between
principals and agents, which “promise uniformity, fairness, and objectivity.” 269
These clearer expectations may benefit agents as well as principals, and the uniform
administration of incentive programs can promote equality goals. Although not all
incentive schemes are highly specific—and although transparent metrics may
inadvertently encourage gaming behaviors in some contexts 270—incentives may do
much to promote measurable and predictable outcomes.271
D. Increased Principal Confidence and Investment in Agents
When motivational crowding-out increases the predictability of agents’ behavior,
it may also increase principals’ comfort in working with agents. For example, one
economic study found that when principals knew they could punish agents at a high
cost for misbehavior, thereby displacing intrinsic motivations with an incentivebased strategy, they were comfortable investing more, which generated gains in
efficiency.272 The increase in principal investment may be a net benefit for agents,
even when motivational crowding-out has some detrimental effects.

Underhill, Price and Prejudice, in submission (on file with author).
265. See infra Section IV.B for examples of incentives for actions that benefit third parties.
Invidious motivations may be less relevant for some choices, such as recycling or gradecontingent scholarships.
266. Frey, supra note 10, at 431.
267. Id. at 436.
268. See Frey & Jegen, supra note 103, at 593.
269. SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38, at 189.
270. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs,
39 J. CORP. L. 669, 823 (2014) (noting that a firm’s compliance program may “provide[]
employees innovative ways to avoid detection” of unethical behavior).
271. See SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38, at 189 (arguing that although incentives
may make performance and evaluation more predictable, they are nonetheless too toxic to
intrinsic motivations to make them wise).
272. Mary Rigdon, Trust and Reciprocity in Incentive Contracting, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 93, 98 (2009) (noting that principals failed to invest more when they knew they had the
opportunity to reward agents at a high rate for good performance).
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E. Marginal Benefits of Incentives
Another unexpected benefit of motivational crowding-out may be an increase in
the marginal benefit of agents’ actions. Hwang and Bowles have pointed out that
when crowding-out depresses agent activity, as in when incentives lower agents’
level of contribution to a public good, each contribution by an individual agent
accounts for a larger share of the total. 273 Thus, even though the incentive is
marginally less effective due to crowding-out, the benefits it does purchase are a
comparatively larger slice of agent activity. When this dynamic occurs, it may
sometimes be most efficient for a sophisticated planner to maintain or even increase
the incentive when crowding-out occurs.274
F. Efficacy of Future Incentives
Theories of endogenous preference adaptation suggest that we can develop a taste
or intrinsic preference for incentives. This has been expressed as concern about
spillovers, whereby motivation to undertake other unincentivized activities
decreases. But interestingly, spillovers may make future incentives, or incentives in
other domains, more potent if they represent preference changes in favor of extrinsic
rewards. For example, once you incentivize a town to accept a waste facility, perhaps
their new preference for incentives will allow more leeway to incentivize the
construction of a power plant or a freeway. Over time, this may arouse concern on
the basis of autonomy and the attitudinal or moral impacts of incentive schemes, but
from a pure efficiency perspective, it may be beneficial for the achievement of future
behavioral goals.
G. The Informational Value of Incentive Failures
Motivational crowding-out is not the only concern about incentives; many have
argued that they distract from the underlying causes of suboptimal behavior and low
motivation. But when incentives backfire, they refocus attention on the underlying
context that made intrinsic motivation inadequate in the first place. Focusing on
financial incentives alone may cause us to neglect the nonfinancial motivations that
shape behavior.275 For example, the failure of the Spare the Air program in San
Francisco prompted an investigation to explain why commuters took more car trips
on smoggy days when public transit was free; 276 this revealed that free transit days
produced large increases in the numbers of people using public transit for shopping
and leisure purposes, causing commuters to flee both public transit (to avoid crowded
trips) and walking or cycling (to avoid the well-publicized smog that triggered the
free transit day).277 The failure of this incentive plan identified two important reasons

273. See Hwang & Bowles, supra note 53, at 20.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations:
Classic Definitions and New Directions, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 54, 56 (2000).
276. Sexton, supra note 54, at 573.
277. Id.
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why commuters may avoid alternatives to car travel, presenting both the need and
the opportunity to address these issues. 278
IV. INCENTIVE ARCHITECTURE AND A FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVENTION
The prior Parts have described evidence for motivational crowding-out and its
relevance to law, the mechanisms by which motivational crowding-out occurs, and
its downstream harms with respect to autonomy, behavioral outcomes, and attitudinal
outcomes. A key lesson from the empirical evidence on crowding-out is its
heterogeneity: the extent to which crowding-out effects are problematic, and the
remedy for these problems, will depend on the context and the mechanism by which
crowding-out occurs. To date, legal scholars have tended to treat motivational
crowding-out as uniformly detrimental, raising the fear that crowding-out will
undermine law and policy initiatives across a range of domains. At times, these fears
have prompted lawmakers to make incentives entirely unavailable, as with
compensation for organ donation, or they have led to arguments against the design
of public and private incentive arrangements, as with the design of executive
compensation, workplace wellness programs, or the offer of compensation for siting
noxious facilities. The precautionary principle—bar incentives that may displace
other motivations—is alive and well here. As of yet, however, there has been no
effort to delineate when crowding-out effects should prompt a legal remedy or
modification of an incentive scheme, and when they should not. No scholar has yet
clarified what forms of incentives should arouse our concern, on what basis, and what
downstream crowding-out effects we should redress.
In this Part, I offer a new taxonomy of incentive schemes that will identify
scenarios where crowding-out effects should demand the attention of legislators and
regulators, and on what grounds intervention may be needed, including the protection
of autonomy and concern for behavioral effects. I argue that incentives fall into
definable categories based on the identity of the principal, the identity of the agent,
and the beneficiary of the agent’s activity, and each category raises a different
combination of autonomy- and outcome-related concerns. These categories can help
us to decide when and how to redesign incentive programs in light of crowding-out
effects. In describing this taxonomy, I will discuss ways which motivational
crowding-out can produce negative externalities for third-party beneficiaries of
agents’ behavior. Finally, I will discuss options for modifying public and private
incentive schemes to intervene in crowding-out effects where they threaten behavior
or autonomy. I argue that these changes to incentive architecture can and should be
tailored to the specific mechanisms by which crowding-out occurs, as well as the
specific crowding-out outcome that is of concern.
Before embarking on ways to classify and intervene in incentive schemes, I note
that motivational crowding-out effects should be of concern only when the agent may
be an individual person, not where the agent is a corporate person or firm. As Galle
has noted, “business[es] and other organizations do not have preferences as such” 279
that are analogous to the intrinsic motivations of individuals; we would expect (and

278. Id. at 574.
279. Galle, supra note 12, at 810.

1150

INDIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:1109

indeed, our laws require) a corporation to behave as a homo economicus, acting
always and only out of self-interest (i.e., the interest of the shareholders).280 Some
incentives are open to both individual persons and firms, such as patent rights, and
these should be considered vulnerable to crowding-out effects to the extent they
intend to encourage individual behavior.
Second, I note that although this taxonomy can identify programs of concern on
the basis of motivational crowding-out, it may only be possible to remedy these
effects where the principal is the government (e.g., penalties for tax evasion), where
the principal is subject to regulation on some basis (e.g., a firm), or where the
incentivized activity is itself subject to oversight (e.g., incentives for donating blood).
It is of little use, for example, to advocate restrictions on the ability of parents to
incentivize their children to do household chores, even if there are negative
externalities or concerns about children’s autonomy to consent to an incentive
scheme.
A. Incentive Architecture Failures
Before identifying opportunities for intervention in motivational crowding-out
effects, it is first necessary to understand why incentive architects, both
governmental and nongovernmental, have not already produced optimal incentive
schemes. If incentives crowd out motivation in a way that is counterproductive, why
have public and private incentivizers not already discarded them or, alternatively,
tweaked them in such a way to maximize effectiveness?
First, it may be difficult for principals to resist using extrinsic incentives to
motivate agent behavior. Incentives are an appealing solution for those who are
uncomfortable or unable to control behavior through request, command, or force.
This may be due particularly to “extrinsic incentive bias,” by which we believe that
others act primarily in their own self-interest and in response to external incentives
and constraints, regardless of what we may think of our own motivations. 281 Several
legal scholars have noted, for example, that when we view the actions of people who
are subject to legal penalties, we attribute their good behavior to a desire to avoid
penalties, rather than any intrinsic motivation.282 Participants in a study of incentives

280. To be sure, firms may engage in some of the gaming behaviors described above, such
as “playing hard to get” because they believe an incentive will be forthcoming. Firms may
also be subject to “distraction” when the demands of an incentive divert attention from
performance goals. See supra Section II.A. These effects may not be remedied by intervening
in any of the motivational crowding-out mechanisms described above, which operate on
individual perceptions and decision-making. This Article is more concerned with crowdingout as it applies to individual behavioral decisions.
281. Ernst Fehr & John A. List, The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives—Trust and
Trustworthiness Among CEOs, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 743, 760 (2004) (using the “extrinsic
incentive bias” terminology); see also Feldman & Lobel, supra note 61, at 1191; Jon Hanson
& David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human
Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 111 (2004); Dale T. Miller, Penny S. Visser & Brian D. Staub, How
Surveillance Begets Perceptions of Dishonesty: The Case of the Counterfactual Sinner, 89 J.
PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 117 (2005).
282. See, e.g., Fleisig-Greene, supra note 11, at 1214.
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for whistleblowing reported that they would personally respond best to rewards along
with a reporting duty, while they reported that others would simply respond best
when rewards were high.283 In another study where individuals assigned to be
principals had the option to impose fines for shirking, a large majority (between sixty
and eighty percent depending on the sample) chose to do so,284 despite the fact that
the highest surplus arose in conditions where the principal had the opportunity to
impose fines, but did not do so.285 Several studies also suggest that principals do not
anticipate the crowding-out effect of incentives.286 The detrimental effects of
negative incentives (penalties) may be more obvious than the potential for rewards
to impair motivation; for example, in the workplace, although many managers may
seek to avoid a climate of coercion, they are often less likely to recognize potentially
detrimental effects of incentive schemes. 287
Second, imposing incentives may be inefficient but still beneficial to a principal.
This is the case, for example, when an incentive is high enough such that the relative
price effect overwhelms the impact of motivational crowding-out. Crowding-out
may diminish the desired effect of an incentive scheme, but incentives may
nonetheless net better behavior.288 Another instance may be where the incentive may
result in a lower total surplus, but may yield the principal a larger proportion of the
gains.289 For example, one economic game study suggested that although incentive
contracts that allowed fines for shirking led to a smaller surplus, principals preferred
to use them because they were able to obtain a larger share of the small surplus. 290 If
they are high enough, fines for bad behavior may benefit the principal through
reduced wages or income from fines. In some cases, incentives may simply save
principals short-term time and resources, even if they may be damaging in the longterm; incentives may indeed be less burdensome than other strategies for improving
performance.291
Third, the previous Part noted that incentives pose outcome and autonomy
concerns. Although we might expect principals to correct the perverse effects of
incentives that threaten their interest, it may be unrealistic to expect the market to
value and correct for incursions on autonomy or negative externalities. These failures

283. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 61, at 1190.
284. See Fehr & List, supra note 281, at 760. But see Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt,
Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices, 44 EUR. ECON. REV. 1057, 1058 (2000)
(describing their study in which eighty-eight percent of principals chose to use an implicit
contract that made a nonbinding promise of a bonus for high but unspecified effort, rather than
an explicit contract that set out concrete expectations and clear fines for underperformance).
285. Fehr & List, supra note 281, at 765.
286. See Gneezy & Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All, supra note 53.
287. See Kohn, supra note 139, at 5. At least one scholar has noted that managers, however,
are wary of motivating employees by financial incentives alone. Gneezy & Rustichini, Pay
Enough or Don’t Pay at All, supra note 53, at 792 n.3.
288. Samuel Bowles & Sung-Ha Hwang, Social Preferences and Public Economics:
Mechanism Design When Social Preferences Depend on Incentives, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1811
(2008).
289. See, e.g., Bowles, supra note 53, at 1608 (citing Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter,
Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (2000)).
290. Fehr & Gachter, supra note 289.
291. Kohn, supra note 139, at 6.
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justify both regulatory efforts and the need to enumerate options for incentive
redesign.
Finally, incentives may be used due to path dependency—when incentives are
already ubiquitous or longstanding, their removal may not regenerate intrinsic
motivation.292 Moreover, in settings where morale is low or intrinsic motivation is
waning due to fatigue, raising incentives may simply be “easier than regenerating
social or moral commitment once this is lost.”293 As described above, these may be
scenarios in which nongovernmental principals may actively seek regulation of their
incentive options, or where both governmental and nongovernmental principals may
need to explore alternate mechanisms for influencing agent culture.
B. Against the Precautionary Principle in Regulating Incentive Schemes
As a preliminary point, I emphasize that we should intervene in incentive
programs only when there is empirical evidence of reduced autonomy, inefficiency,
or harm due to motivational crowding-out, and where that harm outweighs any
benefits that crowding-out may confer. That is, I would reject the precautionary
principle, which stands in this context for a decision to regulate in the face of
uncertainty. The research on motivational crowding-out clarifies that this
phenomenon is context-specific and may vary across individual agents, behaviors,
and time. Many incentives may have beneficial impacts, 294 and incentive schemes
are often intended to benefit society’s most marginalized communities. For example,
government-operated incentive programs for preventive healthcare have been linked
to health improvements in disenfranchised communities, 295 sentence reductions for
drug rehabilitation may indeed increase uptake,296 taxes on alcohol consumption may
reduce alcohol-related morbidity and mortality,297 and a preliminary evaluation of
New York City’s conditional cash transfer program for poverty reduction has
indicated beneficial impacts on education and employment. 298 Barring or modifying
an incentive scheme based on anticipated harms, without soliciting evidence and

292. See Janssen & Mendys-Kamphorst, supra note 154 (describing why withdrawing
incentives may not rehabilitate lost prosocial norms); Kohn, supra note 139, at 7 (describing
widespread incentives as a self-fulfilling prophecy); Walton, supra note 58, at 455 (suggesting
that intrinsic motivations have been largely or entirely displaced by self-interest in the
financial industry).
293. Magrath & Nichter, supra note 185, at 1780.
294. Bowles & Hwang, supra note 288, at 17.
295. See Lagarde, supra note 48.
296. See Bernadett Pelissier, Gender Differences in Substance Use Treatment Entry and Retention
Among Prisoners with Substance Use Histories, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1418, 1418 (2004).
297. Alexander C. Wagenaar, Amy L. Tobler, & Kelli A. Komro, Effects of Alcohol Tax
and Price Policies on Morbidity and Mortality: A Systematic Review, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
2270 (2010).
298. James Riccio, Nadine Dechausay, David Greenberg, Cynthia Miller, Zawadi Rucks,
& Nandita Verma, TOWARD REDUCED POVERTY ACROSS GENERATIONS: EARLY FINDINGS FROM
NEW YORK CITY’S CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAM (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1786981 [https://perma.cc/3FHG-MQUK].
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weighing the adverse effects against program benefits, may be counterproductive and
wasteful, and it may thwart promising efforts to reduce social disparities. 299
Furthermore, the precautionary principle reflects the belief that an uncertain
phenomenon is more likely to cause harm than benefit. To date, few scholars—and
none in the law—have considered potential benefits of crowding-out. I have here
offered several novel advantages of crowding-out, which may offset the harms
traditionally attributed to this phenomenon. These advantages are in need of further
study, but if these theories hold true, it would be inappropriate to proscribe incentives
on the suspicion of crowding-out without comprehensive evaluation. Where
crowding-out may cause harm, a more desirable first step would be to require or fund
demonstration projects to ascertain the behavioral impacts of incentives in a given
area, or conversely, to identify the impacts of removing incentives that are wellestablished.
C. When to Intervene: A Classification of Incentive Schemes
In Table 1, I have classified incentive arrangements according to the identity of
the principal (governmental, private, or the agent him- or herself) and the beneficiary
of the agent’s activity. These beneficiaries may include the principal offering the
incentive, the agent engaging in the behavior, or a third party outside the principalagent dyad. The prior Part explained three groups of motivational crowding-out
effects, including effects on attitudes, morality, and long-term preferences; effects
on behavior; and reduced autonomy. The first of these impacts—attitudinal and
moral effects—is of concern for every incentive scheme, even where an individual
agent incentivizes him- or herself. Because attitudinal outcome effects are present
for all incentives, they are not included in Table 1.

299. For example, some have suggested that after Flynn v. Holder, the DHHS acted too
hastily and without empirical basis in its proposed regulations barring compensation for blood
marrow donation by apheresis. See, e.g., supra note 31 and accompanying text (comments on
proposed regulation).
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Table 1. Types of Incentives and Corresponding Bases for Regulatory Intervention
Based on Motivational Crowding-Out
Principal

Beneficiary Regulable Autonomy
concerns
would
support
regulation
Government Principal
Yes
Yes
Government Agent

Yes

Yes

Government Third party Yes

Yes

Private
principal

Principal

Sometimes Yes

Private
principal

Agent

Sometimes Yes

Private
principal

Third party Sometimes Yes

Agent himor herself

Principal

No

No

Agent himor herself

Third party No

No

Efficiency Externalities Example
concerns
would
would
support
support
regulation
regulation
Yes
None
Fines for tax
expected
evasion
Yes
None
Conditional
expected
cash transfers
for health
behavior
Yes
Yes
Tax
advantages
for
contributions
to nonprofit
entities
No
None
Employee
expected
performance
bonuses
No
None
Workplace
expected
wellness
programs
No
Yes
Private
incentives for
bone marrow
donation
No
No
Commitment
contracts for
weight loss
or smoking
cessation
No
No
Commitment
contracts for
recycling

1. Governmental Principals
When the principal is a governmental entity, every incentive scheme is fair game
for regulatory intervention and redesign. Here, the legislators and regulators who set
these incentives have two separate bases for modifying incentives based on
motivational crowding-out concerns. First, concerns about autonomy and the
coercive power of incentives arise whenever the principal differs from the agent,
whether the incentive is designed as a carrot or a stick. This includes incentives
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offered or imposed by any branch of government, which may be enacted without
some agents’ consent. Second, in the interest of maximizing the effectiveness and
efficiency of governmental action, it is justifiable to modify or eliminate incentive
schemes on the basis of their outcome effects. This concern applies regardless of
whether the beneficiary of the agent’s action is the government itself, the agent, a
third party not privy to the incentive scheme, or any combination of the three. (The
case of a governmental principal is perhaps special in that we could argue that no
actions benefit the principal alone; any action benefitting the government may in fact
be said to benefit society as a whole, including both the agent and third parties.)
Examples of incentives with a governmental principal are innumerable, but may
include penalties for tax evasion, grants or intellectual property rights for innovation,
fines for nonvoting, incentive payments for governmental contractors, incentives for
military recruitment, rebates for recycling bottles, payments for jailhouse informants,
sentence reductions for participation in drug rehabilitation programs, and many
more. In every case, assuming the incentive has a legitimate governmental purpose,
the design of these schemes should be subject to oversight and modification to
preserve citizen autonomy and maximize efficiency in behavioral effects.
Where motivational crowding-out is suspected, the governmental principal should
proceed by first soliciting empirical evidence of an incentive’s effect, identifying the
mechanism of crowding-out and specific outcomes of concern, and then turn its
attention to modifying or eliminating the incentive scheme where harms outweigh
benefits. There may also be public policy reasons for incentivizing that overwhelm
concerns about crowding out; for example, courts have noted the public policy
reasons in favor of incentivizing informants for their testimony—because testifying
can expose informants to danger and retaliation, an incentive is needed to compensate
for this risk, and few informants would offer information without a material
inducement.300 Even if the incentives fully crowd out altruistic reasons for testifying,
the testimony may be worth the impact.
2. Private Principals
When the principal is a nongovernmental entity, there are fewer opportunities for
modifying or eliminating incentive schemes through legal intervention. Although
many principals and incentive schemes will be beyond the reach of legislation or
regulatory action (e.g., incentives offered by parents to their children), some
principals or activities are subject to regulation, allowing for some legal oversight of
incentive arrangements (e.g., regulation of executive compensation in some
contexts). Within regulated spaces, there are several rationales supporting
intervention based on motivational crowding-out effects.
Where incentives are offered in agreements between private parties capable of
consent, freedom of contract will generally provide a rationale for noninterference.
This is often true even when there is a power imbalance between principals and

300. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“To prohibit
prosecutors from making promises in exchange for testimony works an ‘absurd’ result where
crimes go unresolved because of worries about testimony that may be questionable, even
though the system already has built-in safeguards concerning questionable testimony by
interested witnesses.”).
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agents. But because the principal is different from the agent, concerns may well arise
regarding intrusiveness and agent autonomy when incentives subject agents to undue
inducement. Where the principal and subject matter of the incentive scheme are
subject to regulation, autonomy concerns can support intervention to modify the
incentive scheme, such as by improving disclosures or reducing the incentive size to
limit undue inducement. The bar should be high, however, for intervening solely on
autonomy grounds. The occurrence of motivational crowding-out to any extent may
provoke autonomy concerns on the basis that the incentive scheme interferes with
individual motivations, but intervening on the basis of autonomy alone may only be
justifiable when the incentives induce agents to take actions that expose them to
harm. Where the principal is beyond the reach of regulation, contract law rules
regarding capacity, duress, misrepresentation, fraud, and unconscionability attempt
to safeguard agent autonomy. Although these doctrines may not reach all areas of
undue inducement or intrusive surveillance related to incentives, they provide a
backstop to prevent the most egregious uses of incentive.
When the principal is a nongovernmental entity and autonomy concerns are
minimal, the extent to which undesirable behavioral outcomes should prompt
intervention depends on the beneficiary of the agents’ action. When the principal is
the only beneficiary of the action, such as a company that incentivizes its employees
to work longer hours or sell more units, behavioral outcomes should not present a
rationale for intervention. This is because if the incentive backfires due to crowdingout effects, the principal has the capacity to modify the incentive scheme. One
potential exception to this may be where the use of incentives has led to inefficient
competition among principals, in which all principals would prefer to discontinue or
modify their use of incentives, but no principal is willing to be the first mover (e.g.,
reducing incentive-based executive compensation). In these cases, principals may in
fact seek regulation of their incentive schemes.
When the agent is the beneficiary of the action (either the only beneficiary or a
joint beneficiary with the principal), such as when a university offers merit
scholarships contingent on grades, behavioral outcomes are again a slim basis for
intervention. Once we are satisfied on the basis of agent autonomy—that is, the
incentive scheme does not present an undue inducement—and any legal conditions
regulating the activity itself are met, we must respect the agents’ autonomous
decisions regarding the incentivized behavior. A potential exception to
nonintervention may be where principals offer incentives pursuant to a governmental
policy or demonstration grant; for example, many employers offer workplace
wellness programs that vary employees’ premiums or copays contingent on
participation in healthy activities or health status indicators. These programs were
previously supported by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 301
for which the implementing regulations permitted group health plans and insurers to
vary insurance premiums by twenty percent through wellness programs.302 Now the
Affordable Care Act permits a variance of thirty percent in group plans (increasing

301. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-91, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996).
302. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market,
71 Fed. Reg. 75,014 (Dec. 13, 2006); see also Mello & Rosenthal, supra note 40, at 193
(2008).
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to fifty percent with permission from the Secretary of Health and Human Services),
and it has authorized governmental funds and demonstration projects in numerous
states to support wellness programs in the individual market. 303 In this scenario,
although the wellness incentives are offered and accepted by private parties, agency
administrators may seek to modify the governmental regulations that enable such
programs if the incentives are found to cause adverse agent behaviors.
The tricky case for intervening in incentives set by nongovernmental principals,
however, is where the incentivized activity results in benefits or harms for third
parties.304 Where nongovernmental principals are not subject to regulation, contract
law doctrines such as unenforceability on the grounds of public policy may limit the
most detrimental externalities. But where the nongovernmental principal is subject
to regulation, and where incentive schemes result in negative externalities due to
motivational crowding-out, regulatory intervention may be justified depending on
the extent of harm. Although de minimis externalities may be insufficient to interfere
with an incentive program, externalities that are extremely harmful or that affect
many people may be a sufficient basis for action. Take, for example, the case of
Flynn v. Holder discussed above,305 in which a private company sought to incentivize
individual blood marrow donors. This activity unequivocally benefits third parties:
the recipients of blood marrow transplants. Because the activity of blood marrow
donation is subject to oversight by the Department of Health and Human Services,
this incentive scheme drew scrutiny on the basis of potential crowding-out effects as
well as their downstream consequences, such as changed identity of donors and
reduced quality of donations.306 Similarly, the case of pay-for-performance for
physicians compensated by private insurance may also be of interest to the
Department of Health and Human Services if it reduces patient care quality or leads
physicians to abandon patients who depress their performance ratings. Or consider,
for example, carbon offset programs; if individuals who purchase carbon offsets
escalate their environmentally hazardous activities due to motivational crowding-out
effects, the behavioral impacts of carbon offset programs may produce negative
externalities for third parties or society as a whole (e.g., more pollution). In some
circumstances, a private party may incentivize a governmental agent, such as
political campaign contributions in exchange for advocacy by an elected
representatives; motivational crowding-out effects of these incentives will
necessarily impact third parties. Freedom of contract notwithstanding, such programs

303. See Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Workplace Wellness Programs,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 30, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/05/29/implementing
-health-reform-workplace-wellness-programs [https://perma.cc/JH5L-Z3XE].
304. Crowding may in fact be less likely in this scenario because the incentive may not
trigger the mechanism of signaling the principal’s selfishness or perception of the agent’s
trustworthiness. Bowles notes that “[i]ncentives imposed by peers who do not stand to benefit
personally do not compromise social preferences and are often synergistic with them.”
Bowles, supra note 53, at 1608.
305. 684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2012).
306. See Brief of Appellants at 36, Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 1055643), 2010 WL 5854339.
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may draw the interest of regulators if their adverse effects result in substantial
economic harm.
Regulators may also seek to scrutinize or modify incentive regimes when
taxpayers are financially liable for incentive failures. For example, Roberta Romano
and colleagues have noted that in the era of institutions that are “too big to fail,”
including banks, rational CEOs may subject banks to disproportionate risk. 307 In this
context, the impacts of performance executives that influence CEOs’ activities at
these institutions may be of keen interest to regulators.308
My analysis demands a justification of who qualifies as a third-party beneficiary.
When the principal is a firm with shareholders, it can be a close call of whether to
classify those shareholders as third parties for the purpose of intervening in an
incentive with adverse crowding-out effects. I am inclined to believe that they are,
but that additional regulation to protect shareholders when incentives lead to
crowding-out may be largely unnecessary due to existing fiduciary duties. 309 A
separate question is whether third parties include future agents and principals. For
example, consider the cases of systemic crowding-out of intrinsic motivation in the
legal and medical professions described by Schwartz and Sharpe, 310 or Walton’s
description of the effects of incentive pay in the financial sector.311 Future lawyers,
doctors, bankers, and their bosses may indeed experience negative outcomes due to
these cultural shifts (e.g., agent selection effects, inefficient competition, reduced
effort, and reduced quality of performance), which they had no part in creating. These
effects alone should not qualify as negative externalities that demand legal
intervention to modify the use of financial incentives. Unlike third parties to the
incentive scheme, future agents and principals retain the ability to refuse or modify
incentive arrangements. Of course, individual agents in these professions do have an
impact on the health and well-being of third parties such as their clients, patients, and
investors. But where third-party effects are not present, remedial actions may be
better left to collective action by agents, professional societies, and market activity.
As discussed above, I would also reject intervention based on the precautionary
principle when incentives are offered by private parties. Intervention should require
empirical evidence of reduced autonomy or negative externalities, because the
selected remedy should depend on the mechanism of crowding out and the specific
harms of concern.

307. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing
and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. REG. 359 (2009); Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton
& Roberta Romano, Getting Incentives Right: Is Deferred Bank Executive Compensation
Sufficient? (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 241, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2395982 [https://perma.cc/MT4K-CXET].
308. Bhagat & Romano, supra note 307; Bhagat et al., supra note 307.
309. Of course, the business judgment rule would protect corporate directors in any
shareholder litigation regarding the potentially counterproductive effects of firm incentives
(e.g., compensation schemes).
310. See SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38.
311. See Walton, supra note 58.
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3. Agents as Principals
When the principal is also the agent, there is little justification for regulatory
involvement. These incentive arrangements are variously known as deposit
contracts,312 commitment contracts, precommitment devices, and now, “StickK
contracts” when they are created through the StickK.com website.313 In these
arrangements, an individual places his or her own money at risk, then keeps or
recovers it contingent on achieving a behavioral goal, such as weight loss, smoking
cessation, career achievement, or engagement in charitable activities. Such programs
are often effective. Consider an evaluation of a smokers’ fund, which offered
smokers a savings account; after six months of deposits, participants who had quit
smoking recovered their deposits, while those who had not quit lost their funds to a
charity donation. 314 Those who used the savings accounts were more likely to have
quit smoking by the six-month mark, compared to those who had not used the
account, and the difference endured after another six months. 315
Ian Ayres has provided many examples of commitment contracts and
“maintenance contracts”—long-term commitments under which an individual agrees
to forfeit funds if he or she does not sustain the desired behavior (e.g., keeping weight
off or abstaining from smoking).316 As a paradigmatic example, Ayres and colleagues
have developed stickK.com: a website on which private individuals can publicly
announce their behavioral commitments and time horizon, announce the financial
stakes of failure (designating an amount of money, the beneficiary, and providing
means of payment for the withdrawal), and name a third party to police their efforts.
If a stickK participant does not fulfill his or her goals, the website fulfills the agreedupon financial penalty.317 A search of commitments on the stickK website reveals
many behaviors intended to benefit agents themselves, including weight loss,
exercise, reduced discretionary spending, learning a language, or smoking
cessation.318 But some agents commit to do activities that benefit third parties, such
as volunteering at local charities, doing good deeds, calling elderly relatives, or
maintaining social relationships.
When the agent and the principal are the same, there is no justification for
intervention on autonomy grounds. Many researchers cite the example of Ulysses
binding himself to the mast to avoid being tempted by the Sirens; like Ulysses, agents
who incentivize themselves are making autonomous choices. The ex ante agent
signing the commitment contract may indeed limit the autonomy of the ex post agent
(who wishes to smoke, to be sedentary, to renege on volunteering plans, or to listen

312. See Oliver & Brown, supra note 37, at 78, 80.
313. See AYRES, THE $500 DIET, supra note 41; AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS, supra note
114; STICKK, http://www.stickk.com [https://perma.cc/359B-J9YT].
314. For a description of this study, see Gneezy et al., supra note 46 (citing Xavier Gine,
Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Put Your Money Where Your Butt Is: A Commitment Savings
Account for Smoking Cessation, 2 AM. ECON. J. 213 (2010)).
315. Gneezy et al., supra note 46, at 205.
316. AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS, supra note 115, at 24.
317. See STICKK, supra note 313.
318. See id. To be sure, some behaviors such as smoking cessation may also benefit third
parties, such as family members who would otherwise be exposed to secondhand smoke.
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to the Sirens)—there is a reason why Ayres refers to high-stakes commitments as
“disabling.”319 But the ex ante agent chooses to exert this control, and respect for
individual choices demands that we stay out. Similarly, the law may not restrict
commitment contracts on the basis of their outcome effects for the agent. Let’s say
that everyone who signed a StickK contract for weight loss actually gained fifty
pounds due to motivational crowding-out. At the most extreme, we may wish to
require the StickK service to make disclosures to people contemplating weight loss
agreements.320 This, however, is an objection based on autonomy concerns—if
people still choose to sign contracts committing their future activity, there is no legal
basis for restricting them. Most commitment contracts, moreover, would be outside
the remit of regulation; even if an individual signed a commitment contract, for
example, to reward herself for engaging in criminal activity, penalties would likely
apply only to her criminal behaviors, rather than to her self-commitment.
In the most unlikely case, commitment contracts may have detrimental effects for
third parties due to motivational crowding-out. For example, consider a commitment
contract to volunteer at an animal shelter. Although an individual may keep her
promise while the commitment is in force, motivational crowd-out may depress her
intrinsic interest in volunteering with animals: she may cease volunteering when the
commitment ends (compared to a counterfactual scenario in which she had never
signed the contract); she may seek out easier tasks that lessen her contribution to the
shelter; or she may experience a spillover effect that also reduces her long-term
interest in assisting animals or volunteering anywhere without a financial
arrangement (including, for instance, in environmental cleanups or soup kitchens). 321
These behavioral impacts may well lead to negative externalities for third parties in
the form of reduced quantity and quality of her volunteering effort. Currently, the
use of commitment contracts may be so rare as to make these effects negligible. But
even if such externalities are large, they nonetheless provide little basis for
intervention. It would be impossible to police the variety of commitment contracts,
as crowding-out effects in this context do not infringe the rights of third parties, and
respect for autonomy would trump efforts to interfere with individuals’ financial selfdealing.
One caveat applies here. In some cases, agents may appear to be self-incentivizing
(risking their own finances), but their participation in a commitment scheme may be
required by a separate principal. Such incentive programs may be politically
unpopular because they expose agents to financial risk, and on a large scale they may
be difficult to tailor for a population that includes both poor and wealthy
individuals.322 But where these arrangements exist, I would consider them in the
previous category of incentives where principals and agents differ.

319. AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS, supra note 115, at 30.
320. Although, even this is speculative and may be going overboard; it is likely obvious to
individuals that if they fail to keep their behavioral commitments, they cannot expect the
benefits of the StickK service.
321. Arguably, these behavioral effects can be cured if the agent continues to set
commitment contracts and long-term maintenance contracts to sustain her volunteering efforts
and to ensure that her contributions are meaningful.
322. Oliver & Brown, supra note 37, at 78, 80 (noting, however, that deposit contracts may
be attractive because they are budget-neutral for insurers and governments and potentially
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D. Regulating Incentive-Based Policies
Thus far, this Article has been most concerned with the normative bases for
intervening when an incentive plans lead to crowding-out harms. But this leaves the
question of what constitutes an appropriate regulatory response. Although there is
not space here for an exhaustive accounting, I offer several potential responses.
When the harms attributed to crowding-out are sufficiently severe as to support
intervention, a range of incentive architecture options are available.
Most bluntly, incentive programs can be discontinued or barred altogether by
statute, such as NOTA’s ban on compensating organ donors. Less restrictive
alternatives, however, may be preferable, given that financial incentives often do
succeed in shaping beneficial behavior. I have elsewhere considered a range of
incentive architecture options that may mute or interrupt crowding-out processes.323
These may include including agents in incentive design; decentralizing the
implementation of incentive-based programs; considering the comparative
advantages of fines versus rewards versus mandates; choosing in-kind rather than
financial incentives; decreasing incentive size; making incentives less salient or
dependent on a wider range of agent behaviors; allowing agents to choose from a
menu of incentives or donate incentives to other recipients; packaging incentive
programs with messages that signal favorable views of agent ability or social norms;
and using publicity strategically in addition to (or perhaps in lieu of) penalties and
rewards.324 Research on these different options is needed, and the design and
oversight of incentives will vary across fields. But these options may provide some
leeway for preserving the benefits of incentive-based rules and programs, even when
some crowding-out occurs. Rather than proscribing incentives, regulatory
interventions based on motivational crowding-out could redesign incentive programs
in some of these ways (for governmental principals) or set contours for the use of
incentive policies adopted by private principals.
Of course, sometimes incentive programs should be left alone. The effects of
motivational crowding-out may be minimal; incentives that cause motivational
crowding-out may nonetheless work, and they may even be preferable to alternative
strategies for shaping behavior. Crowding-out may also have benefits, as I have
suggested above, and any decision to reshape or intervene in incentive-based policies
or programs will necessarily be complex.
CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed several aims. I began with the first synthesis of
motivational crowding-out claims made throughout different areas of the law,
including judicial decisions, legislative history, regulatory guidance, and legal
scholars that have invoked crowding-out concerns in a range of areas. This survey
provides the first look at dialogue on crowding-out, which suggests widespread
application but little sustained theoretical engagement. I then incorporated

even profitable for an administrator that keeps participants’ forfeitures).
323. See Underhill, When Extrinsic, supra note 5, at 254–80.
324. Id.
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scholarship from economics and psychology to canvass the heterogeneous
consequences of crowding-out, specifically considering the complex harms that have
been attributed to the erosion of intrinsic motivation. This is a counterpart and sequel
to my prior scholarship on the heterogeneous causes of crowding-out dynamics.325
This systematic overview of crowding-out effects can help to identify which effects
may matter in a given setting and to inform the design of incentive-based rules that
seek to minimize crowding-out harms.
I have also aimed here to identify potential benefits of crowding-out, which have
been overlooked in legal scholarship. In Part III, I offer several unique arguments in
this field—namely, that incentives may helpfully restrict socially harmful
motivations (e.g., interpersonal bias), that incentives may increase principal
investment in agents, that crowding-out may increase the efficacy of future
incentives, and that incentive failures have informational benefits. I also introduce
several ideas that have not yet been applied to motivational crowding-out in legal
scholarship, including motivation conservation, an increase in marginal benefit of
agent activity, and increased agent predictability. These proposed benefits require
evaluation. But if true, they would counsel against the proscription of incentives that
cause crowding-out—unless the harms of crowding-out clearly outweigh its potential
benefits.
The final goal of this Article was to offer a principled basis for deciding when and
why motivational crowding-out should prompt the regulation or redesign incentivebased policies. Legal efforts to discard or limit incentive-based policies on the
grounds of motivational crowding-out may only be normatively defensible in a few
circumstances. Intervention to protect agent autonomy may be justified when the
principal is a governmental entity or when the principal is a nongovernmental entity
subject to regulation. Intervention to avoid adverse behavioral outcomes may be
defensible when the principal is a governmental entity or when the principal is a
nongovernmental entity and the incentive leads to adverse effects for third parties.
Intervening in incentive plans is not justified on either autonomy or outcome grounds
when the agent incentivizes him- or herself, even when crowding-out produces
negative externalities. I have also argued against the precautionary principle for
regulation in this context, and for less restrictive alternatives to proscribing
incentives entirely.
Much of law can be parsed in terms of carrots and sticks. This includes not only
entire legal regimes such as tax and tort, but also specific rules that allow, encourage,
or deploy specific incentives to change people’s behavior. The fear that incentives
will weaken or erode valuable motivations is now pervasive in legal scholarship, and
these concerns are often confused, imprecise, incomplete, and inattentive to
alternative options for incentive design. I have here sought to challenge the uniformly
negative view of motivational crowding-out and to offer some structure for
productive engagement with crowding-out effects in law and policy. Incentive-based
rules can and should be useful tools for shaping behavior, and wise incentive
architecture choices can help maximize these benefits when money and morals are a
volatile mix.

325. Id.

